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I. INTRODUCTION
The current wave of international migration is larger than ever before.1
It is also “feminized”2 both in that approximately half of the world’s
migrants are now women and in that the work that many of them engage in
is traditional “women’s work” such as cleaning; taking care of children, the
elderly, and the disabled; and sex work.3 The workers migrate to the
“receiving” countries through formal (legal) as well as informal (illegal)
routes, some temporarily and others with the hope of settling permanently.
While these jobs do not necessarily have to be exploitative, unskilled
migrant workers tend to be employed in low-wage secondary market jobs
that are characterized by weak legal regulation and/or problems of
enforcement, which often lead to high degrees of vulnerability and
exploitation.4
“Outsourcing” care work,5 that is, importing care from developing
1. See generally U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, POPULATION DIVISION,
TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL MIGRANT STOCK: THE 2008 REVISION (2009), available at
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/migration/UN_MigStock_2008.pdf
(providing global statistical data regarding trends in migration over the past three
decades that shows that female migrants make up slightly more than half of all
migrants by region across the globe—a trend that has been on the rise in all geographic
areas except North America).
2. See U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS: POPULATION DIVISION,
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REPORT 2002, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/220
(2002),
available
at
http://un.org/esa/population/publications/ittmig2002/
2002ITTMIGTEXT22-11.pdf
(estimating that there are 175 million migrants
throughout the world, comprising 3% of the world’s population, and pointing to a
significant surge in the number of international migrants, that stood at 75 million in the
1960’s); see also INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, PREVENTING DISCRIMINATION, EXPLOITATION
AND ABUSE OF WOMEN MIGRANT WORKERS: AN INFORMATION GUIDE 9 (2003),
available at http://www.ilo.org/employment/Whatwedo/Instructionmaterials/lang-en/docName--WCMS_116358/index.htm [hereinafter PREVENTING DISCRIMINATION]
(stating that over 120 million of these workers are migrant workers and women
constitute 51% of all migrants in the developed world and 46% of all migrants in the
developing countries).
3. Because of the informal character of most of the migration into markets of care,
the exact numbers are uncertain. However, it is widely accepted that “female labour
migration is strongly characterized by the concentration in a very limited number of
female-dominated occupations, which are associated with traditional gender roles, such
as domestic workers and ‘entertainment’ workers.” See PREVENTING DISCRIMINATION,
supra note 2, at 11. For data in the U.S., see GEORGES VERNEZ, IMMIGRANT WOMEN IN
THE U.S. WORKFORCE: WHO STRUGGLES? WHO SUCCEEDS? 78, 91 (1999) (suggesting
that 30% of migrant workers work in private households).
4. PETER B. DOERINGER & MICHAEL J. PIORE, INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND
MANPOWER ANALYSIS 165 (1971). Primary and secondary labor markets are terms
taken from labor economics literature and theories about labor market segmentation.
Primary market jobs “possess several of the following characteristics: high wages,
good working conditions, employment stability, chances of advancement, equity, and
due process in the administration of work rules.” Id. Secondary market jobs, on the
other hand, “tend to have low wages and fringe benefits, poor working conditions, high
labor turnover, little chances of advancement, and often arbitrary and capricious
supervision.” Id. Much of in-home care work is part of the secondary labor market.
5. By care work, I refer to the traditional work of the housewife: cooking,
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countries, is a common solution for the current combination of a “care
deficit” due to retrenching by welfare states, an increase in female labor
market participation in many developed countries, and an aging
population.6 Migrant care workers supply a cheap solution to the care
deficit by allowing local women to both participate in the primary labor
market and to afford paid, individualized care for dependent family
members, whether children, disabled, or elderly. The effect in the
receiving countries is to liberate women who can afford to pay for care
work from the burdens of domesticity, as well as to enable single parents to
work and ‘coupled’ households to enjoy a dual-income.7
While the demand for affordable care work in receiving countries might
serve as the “pull” factor of migrant workers towards care markets in the
developed world, the migration of care workers is also the result of the
“push” factor of economic restructuring (known as structural adjustment
programs, or “SAPs”) in the developing world that renders the economy
dependent on remittances.8
cleaning, and taking care of dependent family members, when the work is paid for in a
“market” setting or unpaid for in a “family” setting. Care work bundles together
various occupations that, when commodified, are usually categorized as part of the
secondary labor market. These are low wage, unskilled, precarious jobs that are done
mostly by minority and immigrant women. There is a growing body of literature that
conceptualizes care work as a category of occupations. See generally CARE WORK:
THE QUEST FOR SECURITY (Mary E. Daly ed., 2001); CARE WORK: GENDER, CLASS,
AND THE WELFARE STATE (Madonna Harrington Meyer ed., 2000); GLOBAL WOMAN:
NANNIES, MAIDS, AND SEX WORKERS IN THE NEW ECONOMY (Barbara Ehrenreich &
Arlie Russell Hochschild eds., 2002) [hereinafter GLOBAL WOMAN]; JANET BODDY ET
AL., CARE WORK: PRESENT AND FUTURE (2005). Another organizing thread that runs
through all these occupations is their categorization as a sub-category of “Body Work.”
See CAROL WOLKOWITZ, BODIES AT WORK (2006). An additional element of a
housewife’s traditional roles is related to sex. Although in my general
conceptualization sex work is an integral part of care work, for the purpose of this
article sex work is framed out of the discussion.
6. See Helma Lutz, Introduction: Migrant Domestic Workers in Europe, in
MIGRATION AND DOMESTIC WORK 2-3 (Helma Lutz ed., 2008) [hereinafter Lutz,
Introduction].
7. Special Rapporteur, Special Groups and Individuals: Migrant Workers, ¶ 2,
U.N.
Doc.
E/CN.4/2004/76
(Jan.
12,
2004),
available
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/0032d58d2667f0b9c1256e700050f77
f/$FILE/G0410237.pdf (observing that “in developed countries migrant domestic
workers are becoming indispensable to enable women to advance in employment and
society”).
8. See Cynthia Enloe, “Just Like One of the Family”: Domestic Servants in World
Politics, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF GENDER AND CARE WORK 118, 118-20 (Mary K.
Zimmerman et al., eds., 2006); see also GRACE CHANG, DISPOSABLE DOMESTICS:
IMMIGRANT WOMEN WORKERS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 125-30 (2000) (recounting
testimony of women living under SAPs); Carlota Ramírez et al., Crossing Borders:
Remittance, Gender and Development 13-14 (U.N. INSTRAW, Working Paper, 2005)
(outlining the concept of remittances); Robert Burgess & Vikram Haksar, Migration
and Foreign Remittances in the Philippines 4 (IMF, Working Paper No. 05/111,
2005), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2005/wp05111.pdf
(explaining that the Philippines is an economy in which “remittances are by some
margin the largest source of foreign exchange”).
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An important factor leading to individual migration choice is economic:
immigrants stand an opportunity to earn an income that significantly
exceeds the income levels available in their countries of origin and, thus,
ensure their own economic future and/or that of their families. Yet,
migrant workers are rarely the poorest of the poor in their home countries.
Instead, migrant workers are mostly those who possess enough social and
financial capital to finance the trip (even if by borrowing) and that have the
much needed connections to those who can facilitate migration.9 For
example, a study in Europe showed that a significant number of migrant
care workers are from middle-class backgrounds.10 Furthermore, while
economic conditions are an important push-factor, they are not the only
ones. The reasons for migration are varied and may include structural,
individual (personal background and inclinations),11 cultural, and social
reasons. For example, the International Labor Organization’s (ILO)
information guide for women’s migration suggests that for many women,
“migration is not only a means of economic empowerment, but also, and
importantly, a way to escape constraining socio-cultural norms and
subordinate gender roles and to achieve independence or emancipation.”12
Indeed, some care workers find financial benefit and personal
satisfaction and empowerment in their migratory experience.13 However,
many migrant workers (both documented and undocumented), specifically
those working in private households in which the boundaries between
private and public spheres are unclear and effective supervision and
enforcement of legal protections are low,14 often find themselves in weak
9. See SEBASTIAN LĂZĂROIU & MONICA ALEXANDRA, WHO IS THE NEXT VICTIM?
VULNERABILITY OF YOUNG ROMANIAN WOMEN TO TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS 3435 (2003), available at http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/
shared/mainsite/published_docs/books/who_next.pdf (pointing out that that migration
is often induced by an improvement in one’s economic situation).
10. See Lutz, Introduction, supra note 6, at 3.
11. See Laura Agustin, Challenging “Place”: Leaving Home for Sex, 45
DEVELOPMENT 110 (2002). Agustin suggests that migrants are:
exposed to media images that depict world travel as essential to both education
and pleasure, potential migrants learn that first-world countries are highly
comfortable and sophisticated places in which to live. They are excited at the
prospect of meeting people from other countries. All poor people do not decide
to migrate; many that do are people interested in and capable of taking the
risks involved in uprooting in order to ‘find a place in the world.
Id.
12. PREVENTING DISCRIMINATION, supra note 2, at 9.
13. See RHACEL PARREÑAS, SERVANTS OF GLOBALIZATION: WOMEN, MIGRATION,
AND DOMESTIC WORK 150-53 (2001) [hereinafter PARREÑAS 2001] (discussing care
workers’ “contradictory class mobility,” through which the workers experience decline
in their status in the receiving country in order to improve their status upon return to
the country of origin).
14. BRIDGET ANDERSON, DOING THE DIRTY WORK? THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF
DOMESTIC LABOR 2, 4-5 (2000); Taunya Lovell Banks, Toward a Global Critical
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bargaining positions with employers and thus vulnerable to exploitation.
The vulnerabilities and weak bargaining position of migrant workers are
shaped, to a large extent, by immigration law in the receiving country.
This Article examines the role of immigration law in shaping the
bargaining positions and market options of migrant in-home care workers
as well as the care solutions that are available to families, as consumers of
care services. Care work is a sector that is particularly attractive for
migrant workers because it requires little to no formal professional skills,
expertise, language skills, or equipment. Accordingly, immigration law and
policy are central in determining the supply of care workers in many
countries.
Migration into the in-home care sector shapes and transforms women’s
labor market participation and labor market composition in the receiving
country. Furthermore, this migration impacts household structures, familial
relationships, power dynamics, and expectations in both sending and
receiving countries. Migration, therefore, plays a role, not only in the
economic development of sending countries, but also in the economic
development of receiving countries.
This Article tracks the distributive effects of migratory care work in
three receiving countries—United States, Israel, and Australia—with some
reference to the effect on migrant workers’ families in sending countries.
This Article is, therefore, a comparative study of family relations and care
provision from outside traditional Family Law. Family Law traditionally
focuses on regulating relations between family members15 and defines the
boundaries of the family as a legal concept. However, many other fields of
private and public law include family-targeted provisions that influence and
regulate the family at different levels. This Article suggests that public
spheres of regulation, and, in this case, migration regimes, establish legal
rules that significantly influence and shape the family, and are therefore
crucially important to understanding family relations. This Article shows
how immigration policies and their derivative legal rules—which are often
proclaimed as measures of national security, such as in the United States or
of national integrity, such as in Israel (whatever they may achieve under
those rubrics)—also result in a redistribution of care work related
obligations and costs within households along ethnic, national, gender, and
class lines. Additionally, this Article points to the important role that
Feminist Vision: Domestic Work and the Nanny Tax Debate, 3 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 1, 7-11 (1999); Helma Lutz, When Home Becomes a Workplace: Domestic Work
as an Ordinary Job in Germany?, in MIGRATION AND DOMESTIC WORK, supra note 6,
at 41, 53, 55-57 [hereinafter Lutz, Home].
15. “Traditional Family Law” refers to the area of law that mainly encompasses the
legal regulation of marriage (and its alternatives), divorce, child custody, parental
status, and parental rights.
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immigration law has in shaping the family and the relationship of its
members to each other and to the labor market and the state.16
By analyzing immigration law through its effect on familial care and on
markets of care, this Article offers a framework that breaks away from the
family/market private/public dichotomy. In this Article, familial care
provision is not viewed as a practice that takes place either in the family or
the market, but rather as a practice that is constituted by a mix of both
spheres. Viewing familial care from outside Family Law relaxes some of
the exceptional characteristics of the legal concept of the family and shows
that regulation of the family (in and outside Family Law) is intimately
connected to wide social policy debates about citizenship, social status,
labor market, and wealth distribution.
The three jurisdictions—the United States, Israel, and Australia—were
chosen both because they offer useful commonalities, as all three are
usually considered “liberal welfare states”17 with common law systems, and
because of the differences in their migration regimes. While, as liberal
welfare states, these three countries are particularly reliant on the market
and on affordable care workers in providing the care needs of families, the
jurisdictions exemplify three different regulatory approaches to the
immigration of care workers. The United States currently holds a de facto
(though not de jure) open border approach: undocumented migrant workers
do much unskilled labor, including most in-home care work. Israel, with
tightly controlled borders, has a targeted guest-worker visa program under
which migrant workers from certain countries can get a visa to enter for
limited periods of time and work in designated labor sectors (mostly
agriculture, construction, and in-home care of the disabled and the elderly).
Australia does not offer guest-worker visas to unskilled workers, and, due
to its geography, has relatively few undocumented migrants in the country.
16. For a similar take, see also Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation
of Marriage, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1625 (2007) (discussing the role of immigration in
shaping families).
17. This categorization is taken from Gøsta Esping-Andresen’s comparative work
on welfare state regimes. The liberal regime is one of three “ideal type” regimes
identified by Esping-Andersen, the other two being conservative/corporatist regimes
(such as in Germany and Italy) and social democratic (such as in the Scandinavian
countries). A liberal welfare regime is characterized by residual distribution criteria, in
which assistance is means tested, universal transfers and social insurance plans are
modest, and benefits cater mainly to low-income clientele. While the state does not
provide most welfare services itself, it does “encourage the market, either passively, by
guaranteeing only a minimum, or actively—by subsidizing private welfare schemes.”
See GØSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM 26
(1990) [hereinafter ESPING-ANDERSEN, THREE WORLDS] (stating that Australia and the
U.S. are paradigmatic liberal welfare states); see also Avraham Doron, Israel’s Welfare
Regime: Trends of Change and Their Social Effects, 5 ISRAELI SOC. 417 (2003) (in
Hebrew) (characterizing Israel as having a social democratic regime that, since the
early 1990’s, due to growing acceptance of neo-liberal economic premises, is moving
in a strong liberal direction).
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This set of similarities and differences allows a nuanced study of
distributive effects of different immigration regimes in relation to familial
care provision, and markets of care.
Part II of this Article provides a brief overview of the main feminist
approaches to the phenomenon of migrant care work, focusing in particular
on “global care-chains” literature. By engaging with existing non-legal
literature on care work, this part addresses the way in which legal analysis
can be helpful in mediating between competing approaches.
Part III develops a new analytical framework to explore the distributive
effects of immigration regimes in relation to care work, paid or unpaid.
Drawing on frameworks developed by welfare state theorists,18 the
proffered distributive framework aims to explore the division of labor
between the state, the market, and the family in the provision of care.
Part VI utilizes this analytical framework to map the distributive effects
of the migration regimes of the United States, Israel, and Australia.
Proceeding under the assumption that the migration of care workers is not
necessarily harmful or degrading for the men and women who engage in
it,19 the analysis shows that the details of the legal regime of immigration,
as they operate in relation to the background rules of welfare and
employment law, are crucial to understanding the overall risks and effects
of the phenomenon of migrant care work. The analysis charts the ways in
which legal regimes shape, enhance, or ameliorate the risks involved in
care workers’ migration, as well as the distributional effects of the
migration regime among different groups of migrant workers and among
migrant workers and the men and women in the households that employ
them. It further maps the effects immigration regimes have on the
bargaining positions, the familial expectations, and the division of labor
within families in the three jurisdictions. Part V offers some concluding
remarks.
II. IMPORTING CARE
There is significant debate in feminist literature about whether care work
18. See ESPING-ANDERSEN, THREE WORLDS, supra note 17, at 26. See generally
GØSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF POSTINDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES
(1999) [hereinafter ESPING-ANDERSEN, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS].
19. See MARY ROMERO, MAID IN THE U.S.A. 44 (1992) (noting that “it is important
for the development of feminism to transcend simplistic notions that housework is
‘naturally’ dirty work resulting in stigma . . . it is the context in which the tasks are
carried out that make them oppressive”). The assumption throughout this article is that
there is nothing inherently degrading, dirty, or exploitative in domestic work, but rather
that it is the social, economic, and—the focus of this article—legal context that
structures paid care work and enables exploitation, vulnerability, as well as stigma.
This is my starting point in this article, yet I hope this article can be of interest and use
to those who do not share this position.
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can be a way out of women’s domesticity or whether it is a mere
replication of gender and class hierarchies. The debate is further
complicated by the introduction of migration into the equation. This Part
of the Article will briefly discuss the different positions on care work and
migrant care work.20 Much of the existing literature focuses on social,
gender, and economic hierarchies and engages little with the legal
structures that support and produce such hierarchies. This Part concludes
with an attempt to point to the potential benefits of legal distributive
analysis of care work, paying specific attention to the implications of the
“informality” of care work on such legal analysis.
A. Feminist Approaches to Paid In-Home Care Work
The commodification of familial care work has the potential to liberate
women from their domestic obligations and allow them to participate as
equals in paid labor.21 It allows women who can afford to employ care
workers to become closer to the “ideal worker.”22 At the same time, paid
care work provides an income—often a low income—to the care workers
themselves: frequently, unskilled women of ethnic or racial minorities.23
The gender distribution of care labor is therefore left unchanged by this
arrangement: care work is redistributed between women of different classes
and backgrounds, thus running the risk of reinforcing class and race
hierarchies. The “care worker problem”24 revolves around two questions.
20. I will focus here on the debate regarding the practice of paid care work. There
is abundant literature both for and against the commodification of care. This literature
focuses on the morality of paying for familial care and what that might mean for the
family/market distinction, and to the diversity of relationships in an individual’s life.
See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Market Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849,
1885 (1987); Deborah Stone, For Love nor Money: The Commodification of Care, in
RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION 271-90 (Martha M. Ertamn & Joan C. Williams eds.,
2005). My own position is that commodification, in and of itself, does not pose a
moral problem. Rather, the question should be what kind of social and economic
relations are created as a result of commodification. See Joan C. Williams & Viviana
A. Zeiler, To Commodify or Not to Commodify: That is not the Question, in
RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION, supra note 20, at 362. I, therefore, will not engage
here with the general debate around commodification, but will rather focus on the more
concrete discussion about the realities of paid care work.
21. LINDA R. HIRSHMAN, GET TO WORK: A MANIFESTO FOR WOMEN OF THE
WORLD 50-62, 80-82 (2007); Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881,
1901-02 (2000).
22. JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 2-6 (2000).
23. See Irene Brown & Joya Misra, The Intersection of Gender and Race in the
Labor Market, 29 ANN. REV. SOC. 487, 502-03 (2003).
24. See DAVID M. KATZMAN, SEVEN DAYS A WEEK: WOMEN AND DOMESTIC
SERVICE IN INDUSTRIALIZING AMERICA 223-29 (1978) (describing the middle-class
“servant problem,” between the American Civil War and World War I, as being the
shortage of domestic workers). What I term here as the “care worker problem” refers
to a different issue: how appropriate in-home care work is in liberal democratic
societies.
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First, is care work like any other job, and therefore it is not problematic that
employers and employees are divided along income/class lines, since that is
the case throughout the labor market under capitalism? Second, is care
work inherently different, making the class division particularly
problematic? Many of the feminist studies on paid in-home care work
focuses on some similar formulation of the care worker problem and maps
the vulnerabilities that accompany this occupation and the complex
relationships of power, love, dependency, hierarchy, and resistance that
develop between the employer and the care worker.
Care work is seen as a particularly troubling occupation from a feminist
perspective for various reasons. First, care work is socially constructed as
a deeply gendered occupation, constituting the paradigm of “women’s
work.” Care work has traditionally been unpaid women’s work and is often
viewed as an important gender performance, as part and parcel of “doing
gender.”25 Today, paid care work remains work mostly done by women,
though not as family members but as workers. This raises the question of
whether care work holds any potential for women’s economic and social
equality26 or whether care work provides a class based solution to middle
and upper class women’s gender inequality, thus exacerbating class
inequality without fully solving gender inequality.27
Second, care work raises concerns along class and racial/ethnic lines
because of its close relation to social status and hierarchy. The genealogy
of care work finds its roots in slavery and master-servant relations.28 Even
though these legal relationships have been formally abolished or
transformed, the footprint of exploitation and gender/class/ethnic/racial
hierarchies still lingers on, making care work particularly morally
suspect.29 This is especially the case since today it is still mostly lowincome women of racial and ethnic minorities that work as in-home care
workers. 30
25. See Sophie Bowlby et al., “Doing Home”: Patriarchy, Caring, and Space, 20
WOMEN’S STUD. INT’L 343, 345-46 (1997); Erving Goffman, The Arrangement
Between the Sexes, 4 THEORY & SOC’Y 301, 302 (1977).
26. See Schultz, supra note 21, at 1900-02.
27. See WILLIAMS, supra note 22, at 40-48.
28. ESPING-ANDERSEN, THREE WORLDS, supra note 17, at 133-37; see Cecilia
Marie Rio, “This Job Has No End”: African American Domestic Workers and Class
Becoming, in CLASS AND ITS OTHERS 23, 24 (J.K. Gibson-Graham et al., eds., 2000)
(observing that “over time, African American women gradually, and through small
scale, incremental changes redefined their work”).
29. See, e.g., ROMERO, supra note 19, at 166-167 (calling the position that of a
group called “Utopian Feminist,” who “insist that the occupation was inherently
exploitative and should be abolished . . . the oppressive and exploitative aspects of
‘cleaning after others’ or dealing with ‘dirt’ cannot be avoided and that the only
solution is for everyone to clean up after themselves”).
30. DOMESTIC WORKERS UNITED & DATA CTR., HOME IS WHERE THE WORK IS:
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Third, as noted above, paid in-home care work today is mostly done by
low income women of marginalized social groups, and the work itself is
characterized by low wages, high turnover, informal work relations, and
high levels of abuse and exploitation.31 Given that it is mostly women with
few choices who choose live-in care work, some writers ask whether it is at
all morally acceptable for a society to allow it.32
Fourth, care work is a paid, marketized service that takes place within a
family’s private home fulfilling an intimate function associated with love
and tenderness. As such it straddles the line between the public sphere of
the market and the private sphere of the family home.33 The work
relationship that results is often informal34 and lacking in clear boundaries
regarding hours of work, the role and responsibilities of the worker, and the
emotional relationships between the workers and the people for which they
care. The combination of this informality and the relative isolation in
which this work is done makes enforcement of legal employment
protections, particularly difficult. 35
As a result of these problematic characteristics of care work, some
writers conclude that care work is work “like no other” and should be
thought of and regulated more carefully and thoughtfully than other
occupations.36 However, an extreme position that calls for the abolition of
INSIDE NEW YORK’S DOMESTIC WORK INDUSTRY 7 (2006), available at
http://www.datacenter.org/reports/homeexecsum.pdf [hereinafter DOMESTIC WORKERS
UNITED].
31. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, DECENT WORK FOR DOMESTIC WORKERS 1 (2010),
available
at
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@relconf/
documents/meetingdocument/wcms_104700.pdf [hereinafter ILO, DECENT WORK].
32. See, e.g., Adelle Blackett, Promoting Domestic Workers’ Human Dignity
Through Specific Regulation, in DOMESTIC SERVICE AND THE FORMATION OF
EUROPEAN IDENTITY 247, 256-57 (Antionette Fauve-Chamoux ed., 2004) (suggesting
that, though possibly impractical, a ban on all domestic work, and specifically on
migrant domestic work, might be the only morally attractive regulatory position
available). Blackett, however, notes the impracticality of such an approach, and
therefore advocates the extension of employment and labor protections to domestic
workers. Id.
33. ESPING-ANDERSEN, THREE WORLDS, supra note 17, at 4-5.
34. The workers are often said to be “one of the family.” Sociologists write about
this strategy as one that entrenches unequal power relations, and disarms contractual
and legal claims made by the worker. See generally ESPING-ANDERSEN, THREE
WORLDS, supra note 17, at 122-26; PARREÑAS 2001, supra note 13, at 179; JUDITH
ROLLIN, BETWEEN WOMEN: DOMESTICS AND THEIR EMPLOYERS 173-203 (1985); Lutz,
Introduction, supra note 6, at 51-52.
35. ILO, DECENT WORK, supra note 31, at 36-57; see also Hila Shamir, Between
Home and Work: Assessing the Distributive Effects of Employment Law in Markets of
Care, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 404, 450-52 (2010) [hereinafter Shamir,
Between Home and Work] (reviewing the application of federal employment law on
care workers in the U.S.).
36. See Lutz, Home, supra note 14, at 57-58 (asking if domestic work could be
considered an ordinary job and answering with a resounding “no”); see also Bridget
Anderson, Just Another Job? The Commodification of Domestic Labor, in GLOBAL
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in-home care work is relatively rare.37 Other writers treat care work as
similar to various other forms of low paid work and argue that the worker’s
vulnerabilities most often depend on the worker’s bargaining position, and
the focus should therefore be on strengthening workers’ bargaining position
through better enforcement of workers’ rights and unionization.38 While
there are some nuanced differences between these two approaches, their
regulative goal ends up being quite similar: there is generally a wide
consensus that the legal solution lies in the formalization of the
employment relationship and the extension and enforcement of legal
regulation and employment protections.39 At the same time, relatively little
attention is paid in the literature to the details of law reform and to the
processes of formalization and professionalization of care work. Because
of the informal character of care work most of the literature is not focused
on law; rather the problems of care work are perceived as first and foremost
economic, social, and political.40
B. Feminist Approaches to Migrant Care Work
The vulnerabilities of care work are intensified when the workers are
migrants. The difference in language and customs, their isolation from
their family and community, the threat of deportation if they are
WOMAN, supra note 5, at 104 (stating that “paid domestic work may look in many
ways like just another undesirable job . . . but there is much to distinguish the culture of
domestic labor . . . [it] is deeply embedded in status relationships . . . between women
of different races or nationalities, certainly of different classes”); Dorothy Roberts,
Spiritual and Menial Housework, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51 (1997) (emphasizing the
deep racial and gendered effects of paid care work as menial labor).
37. See Blackett, supra note 32.
38. See generally Peggie R. Smith, Regulating Paid Household Work: Class,
Gender, Race, and Agendas of Reform, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 851 (1999) (providing a
history of the household labor movement, which aimed to extend labor and
employment rights to domestic workers). See also PIERRETTE HONDAGNEU-SOTELO,
DOMÉSTICA: IMMIGRANT WORKERS CLEANING AND CARING IN THE SHADOWS OF
AFFLUENCE 211-16, 238-43 (2001) (calling for an extension of labor and employment
rights to care workers); ROMERO, supra note 19, at 171; Laura M. Agustin, A Migrant
World of Services, 10 SOC. POLITICS 377, 392 (2003); Peggie R. Smith, Aging and
Caring in the Home: Regulating Paid Domesticity in the Twenty-First Century, 92
IOWA L. REV. 1835, 1892-1900 (2007). The July 2010 New York bill requires paid
holidays, sick days, and vacation days for domestic workers, along with overtime
wages, and fourteen days notice, or termination pay, before firing a domestic worker.
See Sen. A1470B, 2009 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009) (the first domestic workers’ bill of
rights in the U.S.).
39. An example of this consensus can be found in a possible future international
convention that will secure the labor and employment rights of domestic workers. See
ILO, DECENT WORK, supra note 31, at 94-99.
40. See Guy Mundlak & Hila Shamir, Between Intimacy and Alienage: The Legal
Construction of Domestic and Carework in the Welfare State, in MIGRATION AND
DOMESTIC WORK, supra note 6, at 161 (discussing how, in the extensive literature
exposing the economic and social importance of care work, the role of law has often
been downplayed).
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undocumented, and the temporary and easily revocable nature of their legal
status if they are legal workers all exacerbate each of the four problems
discussed above. As a result, when the discussion turns to focus on care
workers migration, the literature pays more attention to the legal
framework as it relates to migration.41
The combination of care work and migration leads to a more extreme
version of the abolitionist position to care work. Some writers view much
of care workers’ migration as akin to slavery:42 a situation in which
workers have little or no agency in a system in which “migrant women
workers are effectively imported . . . from the Third World” 43 and “coerced
into service work.”44
This, in turn, leads, in its extreme version, to suggestions to ban the
migration of care workers45 and, more commonly, to calls for the
enhancement of anti-trafficking regimes to cover the experiences of care
workers (the trafficking of care workers is often called domestic slavery).46
It is interesting, though perhaps not surprising, to note that migrant care
workers themselves tend to reject the abolitionist approach to migrant care
work. For example, when the migration of care workers was banned by the
Filipino Government under the Aquino Administration in 1988, twenty two
groups of migrant workers in Hong Kong came together to lobby against
the ban suggesting that the ban “hindered Filipinas’ ability to secure
employment, actually debilitating rather than protecting them.”47 Along the

41. See, e.g., Shu-Ju Ada Cheng, Rethinking the Globalization of Domestic
Service: Foreign Domestics, State Control, and the Politics of Identity in Taiwan, in
GLOBAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 8, 128, 128-34; Fiona Williams & Anna Gavanas,
The Intersection of Childcare Regimes and Migration Regimes: A Three Country
Study, in MIGRATION AND DOMESTIC WORK, supra note 6, at 13.
42. The term “domestic slavery” is commonly used in this context and has been
recognized in international documents as a growing phenomenon. See COUNCIL OF
EUROPE COMM. ON EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR WOMEN AND MEN, DOMESTIC SLAVERY
REPORT
(May
2001),
available
at
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents
/WorkingDocs/doc01/EDOC9102.htm [hereinafter EC REPORT]; Joy Zarembka,
America’s Dirty Work: Migrant Maids and Modern-Day Slavery, in GLOBAL WOMAN,
supra note 5, at 142; Helen Schwenken, “Domestic Slavery” Versus “Workers Rights”:
Political Mobilizations of Migrant Domestic Workers in the European Union (Ctr. for
Comp. Immigration Stud., Working Paper No. 116, 2005), available at
http://www.antigone.gr/en/library/ files/selected_publications/eu/070506.pdf.
43. CHANG, supra note 8, at 12.
44. Id. at 13.
45. Id. at 143-44 (illustrating the international debate surrounding the proposed
ban).
46. See EC REPORT, supra note 42 (condemning the inhumane and illegal treatment
of migrant workers and recommending state action to combat the abuse). See generally
BRIDGET ANDERSON, BRITAIN’S SECRET SLAVES: INVESTIGATION INTO THE PLIGHT OF
OVERSEAS DOMESTIC WORKERS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM (1993) (discussing the illegal
abuse of migrant domestic workers under international law).
47. CHANG, supra note 8, at 144.
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same lines in Europe, RESPECT (Rights, Equality, Solidarity, Power,
Europe, Co-operation Today), a network of self-organized migrant
domestic workers’ organizations, decided in February 2001 to disassociate
from the concept “domestic slavery” and from campaigns against
trafficking in women, finding that the language of trafficking and
victimhood does not resonate with the experience of most Filipina migrant
workers. RESPECT activists suspected that the effect of such language will
be to de-legitimize their work rather than to empower the workers.48
The theoretical framework of “Global Care Chains”49 provides a useful
tool to overcome the gridlock between focusing on the interests of the
women who employ migrant care workers and those of the care workers
themselves, as well as between the regulation and abolition of migrant care
work. The basic premise of the care chains literature is to pay attention to
personal care links while setting them in the global context of transnational
transfers of paid or unpaid care work. This literature suggests that, in a
global care chain, one end of the chain is usually unpaid (care by a family
member in a country of origin), while, at the other end, care is paid for, and
that pay is the main motivation behind the chain creation. Accordingly, a
global care chain typically has the following links: “(1) an older daughter
from a poor family who cares for her siblings while (2) her mother works
as a nanny caring for the children of a migrating nanny who, in turn, (3)
cares for the child of a family in a rich country.”50 The care chain literature
is helpful in contextualizing care workers’ migration and in linking the life
stories and needs of women from receiving and sending countries. It
allows understanding of the complexity of the political and emotional
economy of care. Further, the emphasis of the global care chain literature
on economic and emotional (re)distribution proves, at times, to be a
promising approach. However it also has some considerable drawbacks.
First, the literature tends to moralize care and mothering by focusing on
the emotional cost to the migrant worker who leaves her children behind
and the benefit of this arrangement to the employing household, whose
children enjoy this “surplus of care.”51 The migration of care workers is
48. See Schwenken, supra note 42.
49. The term was first used by Arlie Russell Hochschild, Global Care Chains and

Emotional Surplus Value, in ON THE EDGE: LIVING WITH GLOBAL CAPITALISM 130
(Will Hutton & Anthony Giddens eds., 2000). Hochschild’s concept spurred expansive
literature that emerged in a variety of social science fields such as globalization studies,
migration studies, care studies, and gender studies. Id. See generally Nicola Yeates,
Global Care Chains: A Critical Introduction (Global Comm’n on Int’l Migration,
Working Paper No. 44, 2005).
50. Hochschild, supra note 49, at 131.
51. See Philomila Tsoukala, Gary Becker, Legal Feminism, and the Costs of
Moralizing Care, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 357, 423-27 (2007) (discussing the cost
of moralizing care in the care-work debate outside the immigration context).
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perceived as first and foremost exploitative of sending (third world)
countries and of migrant workers because it deprives both children of their
mothers’ care and mothers of the possibility of individually caring for their
children. Taking this path, the care chain literature values good mothering
only as one-on-one care, while disregarding the choices made by the care
workers as well as their possible alternative perceptions of good
motherhood as providing for their families and offering them a better
economic future.52 Further, as the research of sociologist Rhacel Salazar
Parreñas shows, the emotional bond between mothers and their children
can remain strong after migration, and migrant mothers’ care for their
children persists, even if transformed, upon migration.53 Thus, the
literature does not add emotional distributive aspects to financial ones, but
instead replaces one with the other. The care chain literature does not
challenge traditional gendered assumptions about families and motherhood.
It reinforces traditional perceptions of the financial and emotional economy
of the nuclear family.
Second, and related to the moralization of care, is the lack of attention to
the distribution of care in relation to men’s migration or to women’s
migration into industries outside of markets of care. The departure of
either parent into any industry can lead to a care deficit. Yet, a possibly
unintended tendency of the global care chain approach is to imply that
men’s migration is unproblematic in the “care balance,” because men care
for their families through financial provision. Similarly, women’s
immigration to non-care related industries is also less problematic, possibly
since it more straightforwardly resembles men’s migration or because it
does not include the transfer of motherly labor from the global south to the
global north.
Third, the literature assumes that the migrant care worker is a poor
mother traveling abroad to ensure the economic survival of her family
while leaving her children under the care of an un-paid female relative
(daughter, mother, sister, etc.). In reality, migrant workers are a diverse
group: some are indeed poor, married mothers, but others are single, or
childless, or women from middle-class backgrounds. Furthermore, while
many migrant workers leave their children in the care of family members,
others may pay other women to take care of their children54 or have
52. Williams & Gavanas, supra note 41, at 21.
53. See RHACEL PARREÑAS, CHILDREN OF GLOBAL MIGRATION: TRANSNATIONAL

FAMILIES AND GENDERED WOES (2005) [hereinafter PARREÑAS 2005] (suggesting that
mothers’ migration, although very difficult for children and mothers, challenges the
gender order and can be a demonstration of love and a source of pride for mothers and
children); Rhacel Parreñas, The Care Crisis in the Philippines: Children and
Transnational Families in the New Global Economy, in GLOBAL WOMAN, supra note 6,
at 39 [hereinafter Parreñas 2002].
54. Lutz, Introduction, supra note 6, at 3; Yeates, supra note 49, at 13.
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husbands (or other male relatives) who become active care-takers.55 In
some cases, care workers seek to use their relatively high wage in the
receiving country for “social climbing,” to secure or improve their middleclass status in their country of origin and to ensure a better economic and
social future for their family.56 For others, going abroad can be a way out
of oppressive familial and/or cultural conditions57 or an adventure and a
way to travel the world.58 The alternative reasons for migration, the
different life circumstances, and the diverse care solutions complicate the
straightforward gender economy (women replace women, who in turn
replace women) and the economy of emotions drawn by the care chain
literature. According to the care chain account, the migrant care worker is
a source of care to be bestowed either upon her own children or
(exclusively) upon those of others, rather than a more complex subject that
may have an array of desires, aspirations, relationships, and motivations.
Finally, while the global care chains literature creates a useful
framework that takes into account the legal structures, enabling the
globalization of care, most of it still lacks a close analysis of the
international and national legal structures that support and enable care
workers’ migration.
C. Legal Distributive Analysis of Care Work
A legal analysis that focuses on distribution, costs, and benefits, can
offer a way to partially overcome some of the conundrums that haunt care
work literature. First, focusing on the legal structure can reveal what
aspects of the care work relation are the result of legal limitations or are
being reinforced by the legal structure, and, therefore, can create a
blueprint for legal reform proposals that are more nuanced than the general
call for abolition or regulation. Further, by examining legal regulation, the
analysis is inherently conscious of systemic elements while at the same
time resisting over-determinism and through the comparative aspect,
opening up the possibility of change.
Second, an analysis that looks at the various costs and benefits of the
legal arrangement to different actors does not reduce any of the actors
involved to mere victims, or imagine them as the liberal paradigm of an
actor surrounded by endless, unconstrained choices. It allows a complex
55. See, e.g., Michele Gamburd, Breadwinner No More, in GLOBAL WOMAN, supra
note 5, at 190.
56. PARREÑAS 2001, supra note 13, at 86-88.
57. PREVENTING DISCRIMINATION, supra note 2, at 9.
58. See Laura M. Agustin, Daring Border-Crossers: A Different Vision of Migrant
Women, in SEX WORK, HEALTH AND MOBILITY IN EUROPE 85 (Sophie Day & Helen
Ward eds., 2004) (noting that many people migrate because of a natural desire for self
improvement, rather than as the result of a traumatic event or desperation).
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understanding of a social and economic interaction as a field in which all
actors have some power since each has a set of strategic moves from which
she can choose, albeit sometimes limited by personal or structural
constraints and always limited by background rules. Thus, it allows us to
relax the “structuralist” assumption of an all-encompassing male/capitalist
domination in which women are nothing more than passive victims, and, at
the same time, avoids the romantic individualist assumption of a freely
choosing individual in a world of endless market possibilities.
Third, through a distributive legal analysis one can see the strategic
moves available to women within the system and assess how various
women fare under different legal regimes. Acknowledging that power
(albeit in different degrees) resides in all actors and that potential strategies
of resistance are always available, the researcher can evaluate how a
regulative regime limits, eliminates, or perpetuates acts of resistance and
compliance. This distributive analytical lens, which examines winners and
losers and the costs and benefits of various stakeholders, allows not only a
more realist description of the operation of actors in markets and in the
shadow of legal regimes, but also enables what might be a more deeply
transformative view of the operation of gender as a system of power.
These richer assessments of women’s experiences will then, hopefully, be
able to find their expression in novel forms of legal regulation that will be
focused on distribution, aware of their consequences, and responsive to the
intricate operation of power through all actors so as to improve the wellbeing of women inside and outside markets of care.59
Part III of this Article offers a legal distributive framework that is
applied in the context of the three jurisdictions in Part IV. Before turning
to Part III, an important criticism of the role of law in relation to care work
needs to be explored: the claim that law has little to do with care work
because of its informality, and the limited reach and effect of law on the
care workers’ employment relationship.
D. Given the Informal Character of Care Work, What Does Legal Analysis
Have to Contribute to it?
It is often suggested in the literature that the care work employment
relationship is “informal” and that, because of its location in the private
household and the intimate nature of the work itself, there is little effect to
legal regulation on care work relations.60 While I do not argue that legal
59. I have discussed the merits of this methodology at greater length elsewhere. See
Janet Halley et al., From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to
Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary
Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 335, 407-09 (2006).
60. See HONDAGNEU-SOTELO, supra note 38, at 241 (each suggesting that more
than a formal legal change is required to change working conditions of care workers);
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reform is the cure all to the problems that characterize care work, I would
like to point out the significant role the legal framework has in shaping the
care alternatives available to the families that employ care workers, as well
as the bargaining positions, working conditions, and alternatives open to
care workers themselves.
While social, cultural, and economic variables are undeniably powerful
factors in shaping a family’s choice to commodify care, through its legal
apparatus the state has a crucial and often overlooked role in determining
the decision to buy or provide care. Law—through a combination of
regulatory regimes—has an important role in shaping domestic decisions
and in affecting the bargaining positions as well as the distribution of
income, leisure, and care responsibilities between different social
institutions, stakeholder groups, and individuals. Welfare, employment,
family, and the subject of this article, immigration law, all are essential
building blocks of care-related policies in globalizing economies.
The demand for the services offered by migrant care workers, as well as
the workers’ living and employment conditions upon arrival, are
determined to a large extent by welfare, employment, and family law.
Welfare law shapes the basic institutional divisions of labor between the
family, the market, and the state. The incentives created by welfare and tax
law affect the demand for care work. For example, the minimal welfare
support to care givers in the United States61 is an important background
rule that explains the high demand for care workers’ labor which is
supplied in the United States, as will be discussed later, mainly through its
immigration policy.62 Similarly, in Australia, a somewhat more generous
support for care needs,63 and a de jure and de facto closed border policy
ROMERO, supra note 19, at 67; Williams & Gavanas, supra note 41, at 57-58.
61. For a general description of the United States as a liberal welfare state,
providing minimal welfare support to care givers, see MONIQUE KREMER, HOW
WELFARE STATES CARE 50-51 (2007); JULIA S. O’CONNOR ET AL., STATES, MARKETS,
FAMILIES: GENDER, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL POLICY IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA, GREAT
BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 114-21 (1999). For a detailed description of child
care regime and reforms in the United States, see Denis Urian & Sonya Michel, More
Can Be Less: Child Care and Welfare Reform in the United States, in CHILD CARE
POLICY AT THE CROSSROADS: GENDER AND WELFARE STATE RESTRUCTURING 239-56
(Sonya Michel & Rianne Mahon eds., 2002).
62. See CHANG, supra note 8, at 124-125. Arguing that,
in the United States, domestic forms of structural adjustments, including
cutbacks in health care and continued lack of subsidized child care, contribute
to an expanded demand among dual career, middle-class households for
workers in child care, elderly care, and housekeeping. The slashing of benefits
and social service under “welfare reform” helps to guarantee that this demand
is met by eager migrant women workers.
Id.
63. O’CONNOR ET AL., supra note 61, at 134-40 (comparing Australian social
insurance to its more austere counterpart in the United States).
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towards unskilled workers, structures the Australian care market.
Employment law defines central factors in the design of the care services
market: it regulates the distribution of the cost of care between employers
and employees, thereby shaping families’ considerations in turning to the
market to purchase care services, and it affects the employment conditions,
vulnerability, and bargaining power of care workers themselves
(characterized as part of the secondary labor market), partly influencing the
cost of and accessibility to care work. The exclusion of migrant workers
from protective employment legislation or their inclusion in it64 serves as a
background rule that further explains the structure and characteristic of
markets of care in which migrants are employed (it affects care workers’
wages and working conditions, as well as the need for care labor through
the design of familial responsibility accommodation mandates), and the
distribution of wealth and power between employers and employees in
markets of care.
Family law shapes the decisions spouses make with regard to the
distribution of care work within the household. A marital property regime
in which the primary care taker fully shares the wealth of the main
breadwinner creates a safety net for primary care takers who have no
independent earnings upon separation or divorce. This in turn affects
markets of care since it shapes women’s decisions as to whether to invest in
her own labor market skills or follow the traditional gender division of
labor as a primary care taker.
Finally, as Part IV demonstrates, immigration law shapes the supply of
cheap care work and influences migrant worker vulnerability, and the cost
of care services. Once the operation of these four regulatory regimes and
their effect on familial care decisions is taken into account, the constitutive
role of law in markets of care becomes evident.
Moreover, the legal framework plays an important role not merely when
considering the larger picture of the demand for care work, but also when
we focus on the “informal” nature of the employment relationship itself.65
The common understanding of informal sectors as simply outside the reach
of formal governance66 overlooks the fact that various layers of legal
64. See Shamir, Between Home and Work, supra note 35, at 450-52 (pointing out
that undocumented workers are unable to avail themselves to the legal structures
designed to protect workers in the United States); cf. ILO, DECENT WORK, supra note
31, at 36-56 (illustrating similar struggles for undocumented workers internationally).
65. See Basudeb Gusha-Khasnobis et al., Beyond Formality and Informality, in
LINKING THE FORMAL AND THE INFORMAL ECONOMY 2, 2-7 (Basudeb Gusha-Khasnobis
et al. eds., 2006) (discussing the concepts of the formal and informal economy, and the
usefulness of this distinction).
66. See id. at 5 (providing Indian software manufacturers as an example that
informal markets can successfully be monitored by a government without destroying
their market viability).
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regulation may interact differently with the “informal” sector, leading to
varying degrees of informality. I offer the following categories of levels of
informality in relation to the informal sector of care work:
1. Weak informality is the situation that characterizes the
employment relations of most resident/citizen care workers in
the sense that de-jure and/or de-facto they are not covered by
protective social (labor, employment, and welfare) legislation
but the background rules of criminal law and private law are still
in force.
2. Most documented migrant workers experience a level of
intermediate informality in which the employee is mostly not
covered by social legislation and the rights of background
private law regime are not enforced (e.g. a right to wage is
meaningless because there is no way to successfully vindicate a
legal claim), but criminal law protections still applies. This is the
situation of many documented care workers who either do not
know their rights, or, if they know them, face difficulties in
claiming their rights, due to low social capital. Even if they
manage to claim their rights employers in many cases can
manipulate the system to threaten a worker’s legal status before
the worker can vindicate her claims.
3. Undocumented migrant workers experience a level of strong
informality in which workers are not covered by social
legislation, the private law regime is not enforced, and the
worker de facto has no criminal recourse due to fear of
deportation (this being the situation of most undocumented
migrant workers), or de jure through explicit exclusion (e.g. the
situation of migrant domestic workers in Saudi Arabia).
These three forms of informality—weak, intermediate, and strong—
provide a spectrum that is structured by the legal system.67 The three types
of informality do not exist outside of the legal system, but rather express a
spectrum of informality, each form displaying a different relationship to the
following layers of legal regulation: social protection, private law, and
public (especially criminal) law. The categorization is not absolute; some
documented migrant workers, for various reasons, can experience strong
informality, while some undocumented migrant workers can experience
intermediate informality. However, this tentative map is useful as a point
of reference for a discussion about the role of law in regulating “informal”
social and economic relationships that are often misconceived as existing
67. For a different take on the definitional problem presented by the concept of
informal labor markets see Guy Davidov, Enforcement Problems in “Informal” Labor
Markets: A View From Israel, 27 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 3 (2005).
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outside the law.
The reach of law affects migrant workers’ bargaining position. Strong
informality is a situation in which there is no applicability (de jure) or no
access (de facto) to social legislation, private law, or criminal law. The
lack of access to or the inapplicability of these layers of law translates into
a stronger role for “unfettered” market dynamics in the situation, resulting
in a greater dependence of the worker on market powers. Accordingly, the
stronger the informality, the weaker the workers’ bargaining position and
the more vulnerable she becomes. The distributional analysis conducted in
Part IV shows the way in which care workers’ immigration regimes
contribute to the creation of care markets characterized by varying levels of
informality and produce, intentionally and unintentionally, care workers’
vulnerability.
With this understanding of the relationship between background rules,
legal informality and workers’ vulnerability, I now turn to offer a legal
distributive framework to analyze the effect of different immigration
regimes on markets of care.
III. THE STATE, THE FAMILY, AND THE MARKET: A LEGAL DISTRIBUTIVE
ANALYSIS
I propose an analytical framework that assesses the distributive outcomes
of legal immigration regimes, as they relate to familial markets of care.68
The framework builds on the insight of political economist Gøsta EspingAndersen who, in the context of welfare state theory, showed that, in order
to understand the function of welfare states, one cannot focus only on
classic welfare state functions. Rather, an exploration of the welfare
provided by families and markets (especially the labor market) is equally
crucial to the understanding of the operation of the welfare state. Here, I
apply this insight to the study of the regulation of the family, specifically
looking at the care provided by migrant workers, in an attempt to go
beyond the family-state dyad to include the market as a sphere in which the
family is meaningfully regulated.
The analytical framework is made up of five evaluative elements.69 The
68. See Hila Shamir, The State of Care: Rethinking the Distributive Effects of
Familial Care Policies in Liberal Welfare States, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 953 (2010)
[hereinafter Shamir, State of Care] (explaining more fully the analytical framework
utilized here, and its application in the context of welfare law). See generally Shamir,
Between Home and Work, supra note 35 (applying this analytical framework in
employment law).
69. Three of the five elements—stratification, de-commodification, and defamilialization—are taken from the influential work of sociologist Gøsta Esping
Andersen, who developed them in the context of identifying the distributive outcomes
of welfare states. Two of them—stratification and de-commodification—were
introduced in his pioneering work from 1990, in which Esping-Andersen suggested a
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first element, material delivery, looks at who gets what. It examines the
redistribution of wealth that results from the immigration regime and asks
what the material costs and benefits are to different stakeholders as a result
of a given regime. While material delivery is a classic component of a
distributive analysis, the following four elements of the analytical
framework look at distributive consequences that go beyond the material.
The second element, stratification, describes ways in which the legal
regime serves to structure the quality of social citizenship, and, specifically,
how immigration policy shapes class and social status. The third element,
de-commodification, measures the degree to which social rights granted as
part of the immigration regime “permit people to make their living standard
independent of pure market force,”70 thus diminishing a workers’ status as
a commodity. This element looks at the level of dependency on the labor
market required for economic survival. Greater market dependency means
greater commodification.
The fourth element, de-familialization, measures the degree to which the
social policy manifested in the immigration regimes ends up freeing men
and women from family obligations and examines whether care
responsibilities are a private, familial, or public-social matter. The more
care rendered in private, by family members, the greater the familializing
effect of the regime.
The fifth evaluative element, Intra-Household Division of Labor
(IHDOL), shifts the focus from distribution between market and family, or
between different groups within the market, to the distribution within the
family. An examination of IHDOL is required in order to capture
distributive outcomes that relate to the effect of social policy on the time
family members spend on providing household care and the time spent on
other activities such as paid work or leisure. The IHDOL element focuses
on the policy’s effect on the contribution of different household members
to household care work. It questions the extent to which policies entrench,
transform, or disrupt the traditional breadwinner/housewife division of
labor, in which men are the financial providers and women are the
novel framework through which to study the origins and trajectories of social policy,
and, more importantly, to analyze, evaluate, and qualitatively compare the distributive
outcomes of post-industrial capitalist welfare states. ESPING-ANDERSEN, THREE
WORLDS, supra note 17. The de-familialization element was introduced in his 1999
book Social Foundations of Post Industrial Economies. See ESPING-ANDERSEN,
SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 18, at 47-72.
70. ESPING-ANDERSEN, THREE WORLDS, supra note 17, at 3. Note that the term
commodification here does not stand for its more common meaning within political
theory as “the process of something becoming understood as a commodity, as well as
the state of affairs once this has taken place” (a definition taken from RETHINKING
COMMODIFICATION, supra note 20, at 1); rather, it signifies a much narrower
relationship between the individual and the market. The commodification element here
looks at the individual’s dependence on the labor market for economic survival.
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providers of care. Adding the IHDOL element to the above framework
suggests that measures of familialization or de-familialization are important
but not sufficient to an understanding of what happens in the household as
a result of these processes.
The resulting analytical structure is a five-pronged framework, which
includes de-commodification, de-familialization, stratification, IHDOL,
and material delivery, for the comparative study of distributive outcomes of
immigration regimes on familial care. The analytical framework provides a
nuanced toolkit for describing and assessing the distributive effects of
immigration regimes on familial care. The framework goes beyond the
material dimension to examine the ways in which legal regulation
distributes power, opportunities, time, and bargaining endowments, and,
thus, shapes power relations in a broad sense. Further, it exposes the
multiple layers on which any given legal regime operates and the complex
distributive outcomes that may result from various regulatory
combinations. The model unpacks the concept of distribution and the
tradeoffs embedded in legal regulation. Finally, the framework helps
identify the complex set of interests implicated by particular policies and
avoids the assignment of unified interests to identity groups, such as
members of the same family, class, or sex. For example, the analysis
acknowledges that, in the context of care, the interests of “women” are not
unified; rather, the interests of women who employ care workers and
women that are themselves care workers often diverge.
The five-pronged framework is surely not exhaustive.71 But the analysis
in Part IV attempts to show that, when these five elements are used in
tandem, the analysis is far more likely to reveal important—and often
unnoticed or unintended—policy outcomes and to reach beyond material
advantage so as to include power, opportunities, and dependencies as well.
Following is an application of this framework to the immigration regimes
of the three jurisdictions. The analysis is generated through the application
of these evaluative elements is a generalized stylized analysis.
PART IV: THE BORDER AND THE HOME: REGULATING CARE WORK
MIGRATION
One of the paradoxes of globalization is that, as the world is becoming
71. One aspect that can be added, depending on the context, is attention to the role
played by civil society. Some have tried this exercise, tracing allocation of
responsibility for individual welfare between the state, the individual, the market, and
civil society. See generally CHRISTIAN ASPALTER, DIFFERENT WORLDS OF WELFARE
CAPITALISM: AUSTRALIA, THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, SWEDEN,
GERMANY, ITALY, HONG KONG AND SINGAPORE (2001). However, for the purpose of
clarity and in order to focus on the analysis on immigration law, I maintain here the
traditional state-market-family triangle, leaving the civil society aspect unattended.
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increasingly interconnected (globalized), borders have become more
guarded and immigration policies more stringent.72 While for capital,
business, and some skilled workers borders have indeed become less of a
barrier, as far as unskilled workers are concerned (and particularly the poor
of the global south) globalization turns out to be not about breaking down
national borders but about, at least formally, fortifying and militarizing
them. Yet the increased free movement of capital in the formal and legal
paths is not disconnected from the informal and illegal paths; rather, they
are enabled and supported by the same infrastructures.73 Accordingly, a
byproduct of globalization is that, at the same time that markets are
opening and borders are closing, illegal migration and other cross-border
illegal activities are on the rise. The perceived rise in illegal migration
leads to an increased anxiety about borders and a stronger desire for
regulation that often translates into a stronger prohibitive stance and tends
towards criminalization of undocumented workers. Criminalization ends
up, paradoxically, not eliminating the activity but pushing it underground,
thus strengthening the criminal aspects of these informal markets, creating
greater incentives for genuinely criminal actors to promote the forbidden
activity.74 As Chantal Thomas notes: “First, these illegal markets [crime,
drugs, prostitution, trafficking and migrant-smuggling] are an inherent part
of globalization; second, the emerging posture of prohibitionism may not
reduce the incidence of illegal markets and may actually exacerbate their
harmful characteristics.”75
This Part will explore the effects of immigration regimes on markets of
care.76 Documented and undocumented migrant workers are increasingly
important economic actors in care markets in developed countries. Their
migration affects the socioeconomic development in their countries of
origin through remittances and that of their receiving countries by enabling
higher levels of labor market participation, especially among women, and
by supporting the receiving country’s economy. The demand for care
workers in developed countries gave rise to various agreements and
72. Political scientist Peter Andreas called this “the paradox of open markets,
closed borders.” Peter Andreas, U.S.–Mexico: Open Markets, Closed Border, 103
FOREIGN POL’Y 51, 64 (1996) (illustrating how tightening border controls does little to
stem the flow of immigration).
73. Saskia Sassen, Is This the Way to Go?—Handling Immigration in a Global Era,
4 STAN. AGORA 1, 3 (2003).
74. Id. at 1.
75. Chantal Thomas, Illegal Markets, Illegal Migrants, and International
Economic (Dis)Order (2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
76. I limit my discussion to economic migration—legal and illegal—into markets
of care. This Article therefore does not deal with issues that are important to
characterizing migration regimes in general, but are relatively peripheral to markets of
care, such as issues of refugee law, and migration of professional/skilled workers.
Similarly, the discussion will only marginally touch upon issues of naturalization.
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legislative acts that facilitate the migration of care workers, creating legal
frameworks for their migration and, with it, usually increasing
undocumented migration as well.
In the following pages, I will first describe the legal frameworks that
were developed in the United States, Australia, and Israel to regulate the
migration of care workers and then proceed to apply the distributional
framework developed in Part III to examine the distributional effects of
these frameworks on the various actors in markets of care.
A. Three Immigration Regimes of Care Work
1. United States
The United States is traditionally characterized as a settlers’ immigration
regime: a regime that “recurrently recruits new permanent members
through immigration.”77 A settlers’ regime is usually antithetical to the
idea of impermanent migration of unskilled workers which enter the
country for a limited period of time for the purpose of work. Accordingly,
since the 1920s, when immigration was first regulated in the United States,
there have been very few routes of legal entry into the United States for
unskilled workers. One attempt to regulate unskilled work was the Bracero
Program, a guest worker program for farm and railroad workers that was
agreed upon between the United States and Mexico in 1942.78 The
program was terminated in 1964 due to the exploitation of the workers and
harsh working conditions.79 The program was an attempt to deal with a
perceived labor shortage in the United States and, arguably, ended not only
due to labor union activity that ignited a liberal uproar about the slaverylike conditions of the Mexican workers, but also just at a time when the
dependence of agribusiness on manual labor was being reduced due to the
increased mechanization of farming processes.80 There was never an
equivalent program for unskilled care workers.
While the strong
77. CHRISTIAN JOPPKE, IMMIGRATION AND THE NATION-STATE 8 (1999).
78. See generally Manuel García y Griego, The Importation of Mexican Contract

Laborers to the United States, 1942-1964, in BETWEEN TWO WORLDS: MEXICAN
IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 45 (David G. Gutiérrez ed., 1996) (explaining that
the program was established as an emergency provision following World War II and
suffered from institutional defects from its outset).
79. See MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN AMERICA 138-66 (2005) (characterizing the program as a choice between two
evils for the Mexican government, coerced by the United States to send workers to
America rather than soldiers to Europe during World War II, thereby setting the stage
for Mexico’s eventual rebuke of the program); see also García y Griego, supra note 78,
at 45 (showing that the eventual demise of the program was strongly linked to lax
enforcement of worker protections leading to abuse and eventual scandal in the public
perception).
80. See NGAI, supra note 79, at 166.
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agribusiness lobby managed to turn the shortage of cheap farm labor into a
national priority, deserving special visas, 81 there was never an equivalent
lobby to emphasize the ‘shortage’ of cheap labor in the care market.
The lack of legal routes of migration for care workers led to calls for
reform. One such attempt was by the Association for Legalized Domestics
that was established in 1953. This was “a group of El-Paso housewives . . .
that wanted to hire maids from Mexico in order to pay lower wages.”82
The proposal was rejected by the Department of Justice. Another set of
suggestions followed the 1993 “Zoe Baird incident.” Baird was President
Clinton’s nominee to the Attorney General position that withdrew her name
from consideration when the Senate Judiciary Committee found out that
she employed two illegal workers (as a chauffeur and a nanny).83 The
Baird incident raised awareness of the shortage of (documented) care
workers. An outgrowth of the Baird incident was a proposal to create an
exception to the general rule prohibiting the employment of illegal
immigrants to household employers or to establish a special visa for house
care workers.84 In 1993, the federal Commission on Immigration Reform
heard testimonies about the need for an immigration program for in-home
care workers (domestic workers, child-care workers, and home healthaides). Various frameworks were considered, but the matter did not
progress to the stage of a legislative proposal.85
Under the current immigration regime, there are very few ways for
unskilled care workers to work in the United States legally. However,
there are limited ways that unskilled care workers who are not related by
blood or marriage to American citizens can, theoretically and under limited
circumstances, get a visa to work and reside in the United States.86 A
81. See id. at 152-53.
82. ROMERO, supra note 19, at 91.
83. For a description of the development of the Baird case and the public

discussion that followed see MONA HARRINGTON, CARE AND EQUALITY: INVENTING A
NEW FAMILY POLITICS 11-24 (2000). Harrington says that “Baird told the committee,
she and her husband had difficulty finding such help [domestic help on a full-time livein basis], particularly a qualified live-in nanny, which is why they had ended up hiring
immigrants who entered the country illegally.” Id.; see also Lovell Banks, supra note
14, at 2-4, 21-27 (providing the Black feminist interpretation of the Baird case).
84. See CHANG, supra note 8, at 58-59 (detailing how barriers to hiring
undocumented workers often drive working standards down instead of curbing
undocumented employment).
85. Id. at 109.
86. During 2009, there were 163 million nonimmigrant admissions to the United
States. “The major purposes for which nonimmigrant admission may be authorized
include temporary visits for business or pleasure, academic or vocational study,
temporary employment, and to act as a representative of a foreign government or
international organization.” RANDALL MONGER & MACREADIE BARR, DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., NONIMMIGRANT ADMISSION TO THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL FLOW
REPORT
(2009),
available
at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics
/publications/ni_fr_2009.pdf.
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migrant worker can get an H-2B visa for a maximum of one year as an
unskilled worker designated to do temporary and seasonal work.87
Another, more relevant option is an exchange J-1 visa.88 Theoretically, like
any worker, domestic workers can apply for a permanent residency (“green
card”) but that is a significantly more difficult process. The three-stage
green card process of labor certification, immigrant worker petition, and
application to adjust status “has historically been beyond the reach of
domestic workers.”89
The H-2B visa is designed to allow employers in need of seasonal, onetime, or temporary unskilled workers (that are not agricultural workers)90 to
legally hire migrant workers. 66,000 H-2B visas are granted per year.91
While, theoretically, domestic workers can qualify, “it is difficult, if not
impossible, for a potential employer to prove that its need for a domestic
worker fits the statutory ‘temporary need’ of the H-2B category.”92
Unlike the H-2B, the Au Pair program is directly designed to provide
care services. Yet the program is conceived as a cultural and educational
“exchange” program and therefore highly limits the population that can
take part in it.93 In the au pair program young foreign nationals (almost all
women) between the ages of eighteen and twenty six who are proficient in
English come to the United States for a year (with an option of another one
year extension) during which they live with a family and provide
childcare.94 As part of their program they are required to take six hours of
academic credits in an American college or university, paid for by the host
family.95 Au pairs are covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act96 and their
employment is limited to ten hours per day and forty-five hours per week.97
Families and au pairs are selected by criteria set in regulation, which
includes a background investigation and criminal check. The au pair
program therefore does not aim to provide a long-term care solution for
87. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h) (2010); IVAN VASIC, THE IMMIGRATION HANDBOOK 99-101
(2008).
88. § 214.2(j); VASIC, supra note 87, at 76-77.
89. William J. Banks, The Domestic Worker Debacle: The Need For Domestic
Worker Visas in the United States, 80 FLA. BAR J. 28, 30 (2006).
90. Id. at 28 (noting that agricultural workers have a specifically designated visa
program (H-2A)).
91. 8 C.F.R. §214.2(h)(8)(i)(C).
92. Banks, supra note 89, at 28.
93. AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN JR. ET AL., IMMIGRATION FUNDAMENTALS—A GUIDE TO
LAW AND PRACTICE § 5:17 (2007).
94. Linda Kelly, The Fantastic Adventure of Supermom and the Alien: Educating
Immigration Policy on the Facts of Life, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1045, 1057 (1999).
95. Id. at 1058; 22 C.F.R. §62.31.
96. § 514.31(j)(1); Kelly, supra note 94, at 1058.
97. § 514.31(j)(2); Kelly, supra note 94, at 1058.
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families or care work for workers; it is heavily regulated and is therefore
somewhat of an exception to care workers employment relationship.98
Special permission to employ a migrant care worker exists for diplomats,
employees of foreign missions, and international organizations (United
Nations, World Bank, etc). Care workers employed in these households
can be sponsored by B-1,99 A-3,100 and G-5101 visas.102
These
classifications raise particular challenges since many of the employers in
these situations enjoy various levels of diplomatic immunity to U.S. law.103
Since this is a narrow exception carved out for live-in domestic workers
who enter the United States essentially as dependents of diplomats and
international agency workers, these visa arrangements represent a relatively
small number of migrant care workers.104 Accordingly, I will only
marginally deal with these visa classes.
The issue of undocumented (“illegal”) immigration has been a major
area of policy debate in the United States at least since the 1970s. Waves of
legislative proposals suggesting amnesty to undocumented workers, while
imposing federal sanctions on employers, and strengthening border
enforcement, have been discussed in Congress since the early 1970s.105 The
98. See Kelly, supra note 94, at 1057-58 (suggesting that the au pair program is an
“anomaly” in U.S. care policy).
99. See Laurie Grossman & David Grunblatt, The Nonimmigrant Admission of
Attendants,
Domestics,
and
Personal
Servants,
available
at
http://www.wildesweinberg.com/events-and-outreach/651 (last visited July 11, 2010)
(describing the B1 visa granted to care workers who accompany U.S. citizens who
reside abroad but are visiting the United States or assigned to the United States
temporarily).
100. See id. (describing the A-3 visa granted to employees of ambassadors,
diplomats, consular officers, public ministers, and their families).
101. See id. (describing the G-5 visa granted to work for officers and employees of
international organizations or of foreign missions to international organizations and
their families).
102. Id.
103. See Eradicating Slavery: Preventing the Abuse, Exploitation and Trafficking of
Domestic Workers by Foreign Diplomats and Ensuring Diplomatic Accountability:
Hearing on International Trafficking in Persons: Taking Action to Eliminate Modern
Day Slavery Before the House of Foreign Affairs Committee, 110th Cong. 2-5 (2007)
(statement of Caroline Frederickson & Vania Leveille, American Civil Liberties
Union), available at http://www.alcu.org/images/asset_upload_file359_32786.pdf
[hereinafter Statement of Frederickson & Leveille] (discussing the problems caused to
workers due to diplomatic immunity).
104. See id. at 3 (stating that, each year, approximately 3,000 A-3 and G-5 visas are
issued); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HIDDEN IN THE HOME: ABUSE OF DOMESTIC WORKERS
WITH
SPECIAL VISAS IN THE UNITED STATES (2001), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/usadom/.
105. See generally CHANG, supra note 8 (discussing various attempts to pass such
legislation in the House and Senate between 1972 and 1986). A bill was proposed in
the House in 1972, by Representative Peter W. Rodino Jr., and then in 1985 and 1986
in both the House and the Senate (the Simpson-Mazzoli bill, which was introduced in
1982). Due to some differences between the bills passed in the House and the Senate, a
committee was established and eventually the bill ‘died’ in committee. Eventually in
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heavily compromised result of all these proposals was the 1986
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA).106 In order to curtail the
employment of illegal workers, the Act imposed sanctions on employers
who had knowingly employed undocumented migrants,107 introduced a
limited one-time “amnesty” program for undocumented migrant workers
who had lived in the United States since 1982 allowing them to apply for a
temporary resident status, and created special visa classes for farm
workers.108 Almost three million undocumented workers were “legalized”
under the reform.109 However, the reform did not change the immigration
regime substantially because it did not create a stable framework for
legalization or an effective enforcement mechanism for the regime. The
next reform, the Immigration Act of 1990, kept a restrictive line on guestworker visas but increased the number of permanent employment visas to
skilled workers as well as the option for family reunification.110 The result
was a rather stable status quo of incomplete enforcement of immigration
law, and a large number of undocumented migrants that reside in the
United States. Estimates as to the numbers of illegal migrants in the United
States vary greatly and range from 9.3111 to 20 million, as of 2005.112 After
9/11, greater restrictions were imposed on entry to the United States
through formal borders, but entrance through the long border with Mexico
still remains the way most undocumented migrants enter the country.113
Undocumented migrant workers are covered by the rights granted in the
American Constitution (especially relevant is the 13th Amendment and its
enabling statutes) as well as some federal protective employment
legislation such as Title VII,114 the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),115
1986, the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) was passed.
106. See id. at 59 (providing an overview of the compromises in the 1986
Immigration Reform and Control Act).
107. See id. (noting that the act included the introduction of the I-9 form that ensures
each employer checks the legal status of employees prior to their employment).
108. See id. (discussing the 1986 IRCA).
109. See id. (explaining that IRCA included a five-year bar from most federal
assistance plans including the 1996 Welfare Reform Act (The Personal Responsibility
and Work opportunity Reconciliation Act)). States can choose whether to provide the
services after the five year bar. Id.
110. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990).
111. See Jeffrey S. Passel et al., Undocumented Immigrants: Facts and Figures (Jan.
12, 2004), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1000587_undoc_immigrants_facts.pdf
(estimating the population of undocumented immigrants based on the March 2002
Current Population Survey).
112. Robert Justich & Betty Ng, The Underground Labor Force is Rising to the
Surface, BEAR STERNS RESEARCH (Jan. 3, 2005), http://www.steinreport.com/
BearStearnsStudy.pdf.
113. See Passel et al., supra note 111 (estimating that more than half of the illegal
immigrants in the United States are Mexican).
114. EEOC v. Tortilleria “La Mejor,” 758 F. Supp. 585, 593-94 (D. Cal. 1991)
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and the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) protection,116 but the
applicability of other rights is debatable.117 However, the rights and
protections extended to migrant workers are only marginally and rarely
pursued, since making such claims during employment may expose the
worker to deportation proceedings.
Undocumented migrants do not participate in Social Security programs.
However, undocumented migrants can be eligible for various welfare
benefits five years after they enter the United States. Welfare benefits
eligibility varies from state to state.118 For example, states can decide
whether undocumented migrants are eligible for Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) benefits despite their migratory status.119 The
children of illegal immigrants who were not born in the United States (and
are not American citizens) can attend public schools, but, in most states, are
not able to enjoy in-state tuition subsidies or take federal loans to attend
college.120 Further, undocumented migrants may experience other
restrictions on buying or renting houses and obtaining a driver’s license,
since some states these require proof of legal stay in the country.121
(“Congress did not intend that the IRCA amend or repeal any of the previously
legislated protections of the federal labor and employment laws accorded to aliens,
documented or undocumented, including the protections of Title VII.”).
115. See Flores v. Albertsons, Inc., 2002 WL 1163623 at *5 (C.D. Cal. 2002)
(contrasting workers who sought to recover wages entitled to them under the FLSA and
terminated workers seeking back pay and finding that an undocumented worker is not
barred from recovering unpaid wages for work performed); Flores v. Amigon, 233 F.
Supp. 2d 462, 465 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Until Congress or the Supreme Court clearly
determines that the FLSA does not apply to these workers, the prejudice to plaintiff
outweighs any potential relevance this information may have to the defense”); Liu v.
Donna Karan Int’l, 207 F. Supp. 2d 191,192 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (explaining that previous
decisions have found that immigration status is irrelevant when seeking unpaid wages
under FLSA).
116. See AFL-CIO, IMMIGRANT WORKERS AT RISK: THE URGENT NEED FOR
IMPROVED WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 9 (2005),
available
at
http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/laborday/upload/immigrant_risk.pdf
(explaining that OSHA offers weak protection in this context since there is no penalty
on employers who retaliates against an undocumented worker who raises safety and
health claims).
117. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 149 (2002) (holding
that an award of back pay to an undocumented alien who has never been legally
authorized to work in the United States is foreclosed by federal immigration policy).
The Court asserted that it will not “award back pay to an illegal alien for years of work
not performed, for wages that could not lawfully have been earned, and for a job
obtained in the first instance by criminal fraud.” Id.
118. Wendy Zimmerman & Karen C. Tumlin, Patchwork Policies: State Assistance
for Immigrants under Welfare Reform, THE URBAN INST. (1999), available at
http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=309007.
119. Id.
120. See The Development, Relief, and Education for Minors Act, S. 1545, 108th
Cong. § 1 (2003) (proposing a solution to this issue).
121. See Jeffrey T. Kullgren, Restrictions on Undocumented Immigrants’ Access to
Health Services: The Public Health Implications of Welfare Reform, 93 AM. J. PUB.
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By creating almost no legal routes for the migration of care workers,
allowing a wide zone of toleration of illegal migration (due to vulnerable
land borders and partial enforcement of immigration restrictions), and
creating a welfare regime that induces a high demand for cheap care labor,
the U.S. immigration regime de facto enables and shapes the operation of a
flourishing market of care in which most workers are undocumented
migrant workers.122
2. Australia
There are practically no guest worker visa regimes for migration of lowskilled and unskilled workers into Australia.123 The Australian government
supports this position by arguing that a guest worker visa for unskilled
workers represents a departure “from Australia’s migration tradition and
culture. Australia’s migration program was developed for permanent
settlers, for nation-building, not for guest workers.”124 Surrounding Asia
Pacific neighbors have urged Australia to consider the introduction of such
a program in order to aid “Pacific countries in need of development
assistance and with surplus workers, while assisting Australian
horticulturalists to offset labor shortages at harvest time.”125 Through the
years, the Australian government considered and rejected such proposals in
relation to the agricultural labor force.126
HEALTH 1630 (2003) (pointing out that PRWORA declares that undocumented
immigrants are ineligible for “any retirement, welfare, health, disability . . . or any
other similar benefit for which payments or assistance are provided”); Michael A.
Olivas, Immigration-Related State and Local Ordinances: Preemption, Prejudice, and
the Proper Role for Enforcement, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 31-34 (2007) (examining
various state laws aimed at restricting the rights of undocumented minors); Maria
Pabon Lopez, More Than a License to Drive: State Restrictions on the Use of Driver’s
Licenses by Noncitizens, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 91 (2004) (exploring the three main types of
state laws designed to restrict noncitizen’s access to drivers licenses).
122. See DOMESTIC WORKERS UNITED, supra note 30, at 2, 10 (explaining a New
York survey result that found that 99% of domestic workers are foreign born and 76%
are not U.S. citizens); VERNEZ, supra note 3, at 89 (showing that in California, 65% of
workers in private households were migrant women).
123. See DEP’T OF IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP, ANNUAL REPORT 2007-2008
(2008),
available
at
http://www.immi.gov.au/about/reports/annual/200708/html/overview/the-year-at-a-glance.htm [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT]. This does
not mean that there are no temporary migrant workers. In 2008 an estimated half a
million temporary migrant workers in Australia, a third of whom were international
students who are allowed to work for a limited amount of hours. Approximately
110,000 were holders of 457 visas, visas for skilled workers sponsored by an interested
Australian employer, and the remaining groups were Working Holiday Makers, a group
that will be discussed later.
124. Adrienne Millbank, A Seasonal Guest Worker Program for Australia?, Dep’t
of Parliamentary Services Research Brief 1, 2 (2006), available at
http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rb/2005-06/06rb16.pdf [hereinafter Millbank,
Seasonal Guest Worker].
125. Id. at 1.
126. See, e.g., THE SENATE STANDING COMM. ON EMPLOYMENT, WORKPLACE
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The Australia immigration regime does not create options for unskilled
or low-skilled migrant workers to work legally in Australia.127 The
definition and level of required “skill” is determined by the Australian
Standard Classification of Occupations (ASCO) dictionary, which
classifies jobs into nine categories according to their level of skill.128 Only
workers in the first four categories—managers and administrators,
professionals, associated professionals, and trade persons—can apply for a
visa.129
Beyond the migration of highly skilled workers (ASCO categories 1-4),
employers can, under certain circumstances, sponsor migrant workers to fill
positions that fit ASCO categories 5-7 when an employer shows and
certifies that full time genuine positions cannot be filled locally.130
However, no such concessions exist in the two lower-level skill categories
(8 and 9) in which care work is listed.131
The largest category of visas that allows the employment of semi-skilled
or unskilled workers is the Working Holiday Makers (WHM) category.
This visa is intended for backpackers from one of the 19 WHM signatory
countries (almost all of which are developed countries) who are allowed to
RELATIONS, AND EDUCATION, PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUTURE OF THE HARVEST LABOR
FORCE REPORT (2006), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/eet_ctte/
completed_inquiries/2004-07/contract_labour/report/report.pdf.
127. See Graeme Hugo, Care Worker Migration, Australia and Development, 15
POPULATION SPACE & PLACE 189, 190 (2009) (“Indeed, it is virtually impossible for
unskilled or semi-skilled workers to enter as settlers unless they qualify under strict
refugee-humanitarian and family categories.”).
128. The nine categories are: managers and administrators, professionals
(particularly in science, building, engineering, business, information, health, education,
and arts), associated professionals, tradespersons (particularly in the areas of
mechanical and fabrication engineering, automotive, electronics, construction, food,
and skilled agriculture workers), advanced clerical and service workers (secretaries and
personal assistants), intermediate clerical, sale and service workers, intermediate
production and transport workers (plant operators, machine operators, road and rail
transport drivers), elementary clerical sales and service workers, and laborers and
related workers. AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF STATISTICS, AUSTRALIAN STANDARD
CLASSIFICATION OF OCCUPATIONS SECOND EDITION Cat. no. 1220.0 (1997) available
at: http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/ABS@.nsf/66f306f503e529a5ca25697e0017661f
/5c244fd9d252cfc8ca25697e00184d35!OpenDocument.
129. Id.
130. See id. (showing that the following categories require lower skills and are the
following: advanced clerical and service workers (secretaries and personal assistants);
intermediate clerical, sale and service workers; and intermediate production and
transport workers (plant operators, machine operators, road and rail transport drivers)).
131. See id. (explaining that care work occupations are listed in the categories of the
lowest skills, the eighth and ninth ASCO categories, of “elementary clerical, sales and
service workers” and “laborers and related workers”). The eighth category includes
domestic housekeepers, that, beside menial work of cooking and cleaning can also
“care for and supervise children or assist parents in caring for children” as well as sex
workers. Who“[p]rovide[ ] clients with social companionship or sexual services.”Id.
The ninth category includes cleaners (commercial and domestic). There is no current
visa regime for workers in these two categories.
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fund their travels by working for a limited period of time in Australia.132
Visa holders must be between eighteen and thirty years of age, and have no
dependent children. Travelers are granted a visa for twelve months. They
may work for up to six months with any one employer but must not work
for the whole of their visit.133 While WHM visas are not limited to any
type of work, the six month time limit makes it unsuitable for care work
arrangements and, therefore, too marginal to influence the care market.134
Undocumented migrant workers are covered by the country’s labor and
employment laws.135 However, undocumented migrants rarely make legal
claims against their employers due to fear of deportation.136 Furthermore,
illegal workers are exempt from welfare benefits since eligibility is
conditioned on legal stay in Australia.137
By taking the same legal position as the United States—offering
virtually no legal way to migrate to Australia as a care worker—Australia
reaches the opposite result from that reached by the United States. Due to
Australia’s geographical characteristics (being an island) border control is
much easier to maintain and the country sustains a relatively low number of
undocumented migrants.138 In 2009, it was estimated that there were
48,700 illegal immigrants in Australia, of which eighty percent were of
working age.139 Moreover, due to a welfare regime that incentivizes and
132. See Working Holiday Visa (Subclass 417), DEP’T OF IMMIGRATION &
CITIZENSHIP (2008), http://www.immi.gov.au/visitors/working-holiday/417/index.htm
(demonstrating the qualifications and purposes of the visa).
133. See id. (explaining the qualifications for the WHM Visa).
134. See id. (proving a sixth month time limit on the WHM Visa); see also AUPAIR
VISA AUSTRALIA—AU PAIR PROGRAM IN AUSTRALIA, http://aupair-visaaustralia.greataupair.com (last visited Jan. 16, 2011) (showing that although Australia
does not have an official au-pair visa, there are agencies that connect WHM travelers
with interested families. However, since the employment is limited to six months
period it is therefore not suitable for the care needs of most families).
135. See Robert Guthrie & Michael Quinlan, The Occupational Safety and Health
Rights and Workers’ Compensation Entitlements of Illegal Immigrants: An Emerging
Challenge, 2 POL’Y & PRAC. IN HEALTH & SAFETY 77 (2005); see also Fitzgerald v. F.
J. Leonhardt Pty Ltd. (1997) 71 ALJR 653; Yango Pastoral Co. Pty Ltd. v. First
Chicago Australia Ltd. & Ors (1978) 139 CLR 410 (deeming an employment contract
with an undocumented worker legal, and therefore the applicable employment law
enforceable). But see Australia Meat Holdings Pty Ltd. V. Kazi (2004) QCA 147
(finding that an undocumented worker is not a worker for the purposes of employee
compensation).
136. Migration Act 1958 (Cth) c 83(2) (Austl.).
137. Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth) c 7 (Austl.). Eligibility is conditioned on residency.
Moreover, for most benefits documented workers become eligible only after a yearlong
waiting period.
138. See Adrienne Millbank, Boat People, Illegal Immigration and Asylum Seekers:
in
Perspective,
13
CURRENT
ISSUES
BRIEF
(Dec.
14,
1999),
http://www.aph.gov.au/Library/pubs/CIB/1999-2000/2000cib13.htm
(comparing
Australia’s estimated illegal population of 53,000 to that of the United States and
Western Europe approximated at over five million respectively).
139. See id. (explaining that the majority of illegal migrants in Australia, mostly
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aids families in purchasing formal (registered or approved) care services,140
and an employment regime that accommodates familial responsibilities in a
more effective way than the U.S. regime,141 the Australian care market is
composed mostly of documented and Australian workers.142 Accordingly
Australia has much less vulnerable and much better paid care workers and
a smaller care market.
3. Israel
Israel’s immigration regime is based on the Law of Return and the Law
of Citizenship and Entry to Israel that grant immediate citizenship to any
Jewish person or person of Jewish descent and create a naturalization
process for non-Jews who marry an Israeli citizen.143 Naturalization
through marriage with a citizen has an important “interim” exception of
persons from Arab states whom cannot be naturalized upon marriage with
an Israeli citizen.144
Labor migration was introduced in Israel during 1993. Following the
outbreak of the first Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories against
Israeli occupation (first Intifadah) and the Oslo Accord signed in 1993,
individuals who entered the country legally and have overstayed their visas, are
unskilled workers); see also Fact Sheet 87: Initiatives to Combat Illegal Work in
Australia,
DEP’T
OF
IMMIGRATION
&
CITIZENSHIP
(2009),
http://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/87illegal.htm [hereinafter Fact Sheet 87]
(articulating that each year the Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship
locates a number of individuals unlawfully working in the country, principally in the
agriculture, accommodation, and construction industries).
140. See A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999 (Cth) s 41(2) (Austl.)
(providing child care benefits exclusively for approved and registered caregivers); see
also HILA SHAMIR, CARE COMMODIFIED: A REEVALUATION OF THE LEGAL REGULATION
OF CARE WORK IN GLOBALIZING ECONOMIES 102-04 (2008) (dissertation, Harvard Law
School) (elaborating that Australia utilizes instruments such as, its Child Care Benefit
System (CCB or CCBS), to subsidize approved child care, mainly group care in centrebased settings, and registered child care, individualized care in the child’s or
caregiver’s home, through a subsidy or a cash payment in addition to tax benefits, child
care rebates and care payments).
141. See, e.g., O’CONNOR ET AL., supra note 61, at 84-88 (illustrating that Australia
provides mothers with up to fifty-two weeks of maternity leave compared to twelve in
the United States, permits fathers one week of unpaid paternal leave, and allows for a
maximum of fifty-one weeks of parental leave).
142. See Hugo, supra note 127, at 194-95 (noting that the significant difficulty in
recruiting young Australian workers into the industry, and the rising demand for care,
coupled with the unfavorable immigration regime is likely to cause a labor shortage in
the care work industry).
143. See Gershon Shafir & Yoav Peled, Citizenship and Stratification in an Ethnic
Democracy, 21 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 408, 412 (1998) (detailing the establishment
of the “Law of Return” affording automatic citizenship to all Jews who immigrate to
Israel).
144. See HCJ 705203 Adala v. Minister of the Interior PD 10 [2006] (Isr.)
(affirming the constitutionality of the law despite the recognition that it violates the
right to equality and family life because of Israel’s compelling and unique national
security interests).
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Palestinians were no longer permitted to enter Israel for work purposes.145
The “sealing” of the occupied territories, said to be caused by security
considerations, led to a labor shortage in the Israeli secondary labor market,
especially in the fields of construction and agriculture.146 In order to deal
with the labor shortage the Israeli government established a guest worker
visa program.147
Migrant workers in Israel—documented and
undocumented—work in the secondary labor market and in the least
desirable occupations. It is now estimated that migrant workers constitute
ten percent of the Israeli labor market.148
Permission to employ a migrant worker is limited to certain industries,
namely construction, agriculture, restaurants, and care work (in-home
health aides) for elderly and disabled persons.149 While the demand for
workers in construction and agriculture was the direct result of the sealing
of the occupied territories, the same was not true concerning care work.150
Palestinians were not previously employed as in-home health aides, and, in
fact, there was not a thriving market for such care workers. The guest
worker regime was developed in tandem with developments in the Israel
welfare state. Beginning in 1988 Israel offered a long-term care benefit
(Gimlat Siuud) for elderly citizens requiring assistance in everyday
activities.151 The benefit is age tested (the recipient must be of mandatory
145. See GUY MUNDLAK, FADING CORPORATISM: ISRAEL’S LABOR LAW AND
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN TRANSITION 194 (2007) (suggesting that the mutual
dependency of the Palestinian and Israeli economies came to an end following
employers’ successful efforts at lobbying the Minister of Labor to admit workers from
other nations for agricultural and construction jobs in lieu of Palestinians); REBECA
RAIJMAN & ADRIANA KEMP, MIGRANTS AND WORKERS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
LABOUR MIGRATION IN ISRAEL 67-72 (2008) (in Hebrew); Nelly Elias & Adriana
Kemp, The New Second Generation: Non-Jewish Olim, Black Jews and Children of
Migrant Workers in Israel, 15 ISRAEL STUD. 73, 73 (2010) (stating that a massive
influx of immigrants flowed into Israel in the 1990s).
146. See LEILA FARKESH, PALESTINIAN LABOR MIGRATION TO ISRAEL: LABOR, LAND
AND OCCUPATION 76-90 (2005) (detailing the labor migration of Palestinians into Israel
before and after the first Intifada).
147. See, e.g., Adriana Kemp et al., Contesting the Limits of Political Participation:
Latinos and Black African Migrant Workers in Israel, 23 ETHNIC RACIAL STUD. 94, 99
(2000).
148. INT’L LABOUR ORGANIZATION, NATIONAL LABOUR LAW PROFILE: THE STATE
OF
ISRAEL,
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/
info/national/is.htm#_ftn3 (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).
149. See Moshe Semyonov et al., Labor Market Competition, Perceived Threat, and
Endorsement of Economic Discrimination against Foreign Workers in Israel, 49 SOC.
PROBLEMS 416, 419 (asserting that non-citizen workers typically obtain low-paying
menial jobs in construction, agriculture, and service industries with migrants from
Romania, Thailand, and the Philippines dominating each sector respectively).
150. See id.
151. See Hillel Schmid, The Israeli Long-Term Care Insurance Law: Selected Issues
in Providing Home Care Services to the Frail Elderly, 13 HEALTH & SOC. CARE IN THE
COMMUNITY 191, 192 (2005) (establishing that Israel recognized a need to implement
legislation entitling elderly individuals to long-term care).
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retirement age), income tested, and tested for dependency levels (ADL
test).152 The ADL test serves another purpose besides determining longterm care benefit eligibility. Both those eligible for the long-term care
benefit and those who pass the dependency test but not the income test are
eligible to apply to the relevant governmental agency for a permit to
employ a migrant worker as an in-home care aides.153 The demand for inhome health aides expanded significantly in Israel since the early 1990s,
leading to a substantial increase in the number of care workers entering
Israel.154 While in other sectors the number of migrant workers who can
enter Israel on a guest worker visa is capped, in the care work sector there
is no cap. The number of care workers who can enter is linked to the
number of Israeli residents found eligible to qualify for a care worker
permit.155 Between 1996 and 2003, the number of Israeli residents who
were found eligible and applied for such a visa increased by three hundred
and fifty percent while the number of the elderly and disabled increased by
only twenty-five percent.156 A recent report suggests that, if current trends
and policy persist, by 2025, 108,000 migrant care workers will work in
Israel, which means that every fifth elderly person in Israel will be aided by
a migrant care worker.157
Guest worker visas are granted to workers from countries that are
signatories to bilateral agreements with Israel. The main countries of origin
in the care work sector are the Philippines, Eastern European states, Nepal,
and India.158 For the first two decades of the arrangement (until 2006)
migration was based on a “binding system”: migrant workers entering the
country were issued work visas that were valid only for a specific
152. See id. (maintaining that eligibility for benefits begins at age sixty for women
and sixty-five for men, the criteria for eligibility is dependent on an elderly person’s
ability to perform activities of daily living, and although the income of an applicant and
his spouse (but not their children) is considered, the limit is relatively generous, so that
only one percent of applicants were turned down in 1996).
153. See MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR, Criterions for Eligibility for Employing
Foreign
Workers
(June
2010)
(in
Hebrew)
available
at
http://www.piba.gov.il/Subject/ForeignWorkers/siod/Pages/CriteriaForPermit.aspx.
154. Mimi Ajzenstadt & Zeev Rozenhek, Privatization and New Modes of State
Intervention: The Long-Term Care Programme in Israel, 29 J. SOC. POL’Y 247, 257
(2000) (confirming that three years after the program’s implementation, the number of
private agencies providing care services went from virtually zero to 106).
155. Zvi Eckstein et al., Employing Migrant Workers: Report for the Caesarea
Forum for Economic National Policy 6-7 (2010) (in Hebrew), available at
http://www.idi.org.il/events1/CaesareaForum/Documents/%202010קיסריה/WM_C.pd
f.
156. MINISTRY OF FIN. & MINISTRY OF INDUS., COMMERCE AND LABOR, THE INTERMINISTRY REPORT ON MIGRANT WORKER EMPLOYMENT POLICY IN ISRAEL AND THE
CONDITIONS FOR ISSUING MIGRANT WORKER EMPLOYMENT PERMITS (2004) (in
Hebrew) [hereinafter INTER-MINISTRY REPORT].
157. Eckstein et al., supra note 155, at 21.
158. Id.
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employer.159 Visa conditions were attached to one employer in the sense
that leaving that employer for whatever reason was a violation of the visa
conditions, rendering the worker “illegal,” and, thus, subject to detention
and deportation.160 The binding system was found to be unconstitutional
by the high court of justice161 and replaced by a system that binds the
workers to a sector, rather than an employer.162 A worker can, therefore,
move from one employer to another within the same labor sector.163 In the
care work sector, this is regulated and managed via licensed placement
agencies that specialize in the placement of care workers.164
The entrance of non-Jewish immigrants into Israel seemingly contradicts
the basic principles of the Israeli migration regime, which gives primacy to
ethno-national criteria in attributing full membership in the polity.165 This
contradiction is “softened” by the fact that the non-Jewish migrant
workers’ inclusion in the state is done on a temporary basis and opens
almost no legal routes for naturalization or permanent residency, making
Israel’s immigration regime a hybrid one, in that it is both a “settlers
regime,”166 in the sense that is seeks to attract new members through Jewish
immigration, and a “guest-worker regime,” in that it admits non-Jews but
refuses to consider them as prospective members of the society.167
159. See Adrianna Kemp, Reforming Policies on Foreign Workers in Israel 19
(OECD Soc., Emp’t & Migration, Working Paper No. 103, 2010) (explaining that
Israel’s binding policy subjected foreign workers to violations of labor rights, as
workers who sought redress for violations were often fired and thus lost their legal
status); see also RAIJMAN & KEMP, supra note 145, at 98-103.
160. Entry to Israel Law 5712-1952 §13 (Isr.) (regulating the detention and
deportation of undocumented migrant workers).
161. HCJ 4542/02 Kav LaOved v. Gov’t of Israel 3 [2006] (Isr.) (invalidating the
binding employment arrangement because it created a legal regime that ran counter to
the basic right to human dignity).
162. See Kemp, supra note 159, at 30-31; Guide to the Employment of Migrant
Workers:
Care
Workers,
ISR.
GOV’T
PORTAL
(in
Hebrew)
http://www.gov.il/FirstGov/TopNav/Situations/SPopulationsGuides/SHiringForeignW
orkers/SFWDifferentJobs/ (last visited July 11, 2010).
163. See id. (maintaining that licensed employment agencies contract workers out to
various employers, allowing the workers to switch employers under certain
circumstances).
164. Eckstein et al., supra note 155, at 21; see also GILAD NATAN & THE KNESSET
RES. & INFO. CTR, REGULATING THE EMPLOYMENT OF MIGRANT WORKERS IN MARKETS
FOR
IN-HOME
CARE
(2006),
http://www.knesset.gov.il/mmm/doc.asp?doc=m01721&type=doc (in Hebrew).
165. See Shafir & Peled, supra note 143, at 412-13 (emphasizing that establishing an
ethno-nationalist citizenship regime expressed Israel’s ethnic Jewish identity and selfdefinition as a Jewish state).
166. See Zeev Rosenhek, Migration Regimes, Intra-State Conflicts, and the Politics
of Exclusion and Inclusion: Migrant Workers in the Israeli Welfare State, 47 SOC.
PROBLEMS 49, 53 (2000) [hereinafter Rosenhek, Migration Regimes] (characterizing
Israel’s immigration policy as a “settler regime” for its focus on Zionist nation-building
aimed at attracting new Jewish members through immigration).
167. See id. at 54 (suggesting that Israel also espouses a “guest-worker regime” with
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Beside migrant workers who became illegal by over-staying their visas
or violating other visa conditions,168 there is another type of illegal
migration into Israel that became common in the last two decades. This
type of “illegality” characterizes individuals—mostly from African
countries and from Latin America—who entered Israel legally on tourist
visas and violated their visa conditions by working in Israel and overstaying their visa.169 Many of these workers are incorporated in cleaning
and child-care jobs. Unlike documented workers, undocumented workers
more often live in the inner cities rather than in an employer’s home and
often have several employers, providing them greater access to community
and social resources and making them more visible inhabitants of the urban
space in Israeli cities (mainly in metropolitan Tel-Aviv).170 These workers,
like all undocumented workers in Israel, are vulnerable to exploitation due
to the lingering threat of deportation even though they are theoretically
protected by protective employment laws.171
While in other industries the guest worker visa is limited to five years,
after which the employer is responsible for the worker’s departure from
Israel, care workers can, under certain conditions, apply for almost
unlimited extensions of their visas.172 An extension can be given for a year
at a time if the migrant care worker was employed for a full year by the
same employer, and a social worker determined that the workers’ departure
will cause severe harm to the person in their care.173 As a result some
migrant care workers, especially those taking care of disabled children, can
remain in Israel legally for decades yet not gain any legal rights towards
residency or citizenship.
Documented migrant workers in Israel are theoretically covered by all
regard to non-Jewish immigrants out of fear that their settlement is a threat to Israel’s
religious character).
168. ISRAELI CENT. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, At the End of 2008 in Israel: 115,000
Foreign Workers who Entered with Work Permits, and 107,000 who Entered as
Tourists (2009) (in Hebrew), available at http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/newhodaot/
hodaa_template.html?hodaa=200920161 (estimating that 222,000 migrant workers,
both documented and undocumented, were present and working in Israel in 2008).
169. See Rebecca Raijman et al., International Migration, Domestic Work and Care
Work: Undocumented Latina Migrants in Israel, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 8,
at 145, 148-49.
170. See Kemp et al., supra note 147, at 101, 112 (explaining that undocumented
migrant workers develop communities in response to a lack of legal status as a means
of survival); see also RAIJMAN & KEMP, supra note 145, at 177-84.
171. See Raijman et al., supra note 169, at 153 (stating that “although
undocumented workers have the right to claim their share, they rarely take this option
even when nongovernmental organizations are ready to act on their behalf. As a rule
they prefer to lose their money and change jobs rather than take legal action that may
entail the risk of being caught by the police and being deported.”).
172. ARYRH GREENFIELD, ENTRY, RESIDENCE, AND CITIZENSHIP 9 (1996).
173. Entry to Israel Law 5712-1952 § 3(3)(b) (Isr.).
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employment protective legislation174 as well as three social benefit
schemes—work injuries, employer’s bankruptcy, and maternity—of the
National Insurance Institute (NII).175 The employment of migrant workers
is further regulated by the Foreign Workers Law (Prohibition on Unlawful
Employment, and the Assurance of Fair Conditions) 1991, that guarantees
migrant workers the right to fair working conditions, decent
accommodation, health insurance bought by the employer, and a written
employment contract in the workers’ language. This regulation maintains
minimal direct involvement of the state in the living and working
conditions of the workers through assigning employers the responsibility
for providing these social services. Employers, seeking to reduce costs and
facing very weak enforcement of their obligations, often do not comply
with the requirements. Accordingly, in reality, few migrant workers enjoy
the full range of the rights theoretically extended by law.176
Undocumented workers are also theoretically protected by all
employment laws but formally have no access to health insurance and the
NII benefits. However the Tel-Aviv municipality (most undocumented
migrant workers in Israel reside in its jurisdiction) and local NGOs step in
to provide some of these services.177 Undocumented migrant workers and
their families therefore have access to some health care provision (through
NGOs such as Physicians for Human Rights, as well as ad-hoc decisions by
hospitals and municipal centers for family and infant health), schools, and
kindergarten and other social services provided by the municipality.178
174. See Mundlak & Shamir, supra note 40, at 165-66 (suggesting that live-in care
workers are excluded from over-time because the line between personal and employer
time becomes blurred and difficult to ascertain in a household setting). Contra HCJ
1678/07 Yolanda Gluten v. National Labor Court 3 [2009] (Isr.) (affirming the
National Labor Court opinion that live-in care workers are excluded from overtime
compensation on the basis of the “personal trust” exception under the Work and Rest
Hours Law).
175. See Rosenhek, Migration Regimes, supra note 166, at 59 (noting that at the
same time, migrant workers are not eligible for important social security programs such
as old age and unemployment benefits, survivors’ pensions, and children’s allowances).
176. KAV LAOVED, Principles to Regulate the Employment of Migrant Workers
(2006) http://www.kavlaoved.org.il/UserFiles/news62_file.DOC (Hebrew).
177. See Adriana Kemp & Rebeca Raijman, “Foreigners” in a Jewish State: The
New Politics of Labor Migration in Israel, 3 ISRAELI SOC. 79 (2001); Rosenhek,
Migration Regimes, supra note 166, at 60-61 (recognizing that the Tel Aviv
Municipality finances the social services it provides to undocumented workers at the
expense of extra funding from the central government who views the municipalities
actions with contention); NIVI KLEIN-ZEEVI & KNESSET RES. & INFO. CTR., Tel-Aviv
Yafo
Municipality
and
Foreign
Workers
(2003),
available
at
http://www.knesset.gov.il/MMM/doc.asp?doc=m00578&type=rtf
(Hebrew)
(articulating that the Welfare Department of Tel Aviv established programs in support
of a new urban policy and management toward migrant workers including a forum on
foreign workers and working teams to propose policy recommendations).
178. See RAIJMAN & KEMP, supra note 145, at 177-184; see also KLEIN-ZEEVI &
KNESSET RES. & INFO. CTR, supra note 177, at 3.
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To ensure that the workers’ stay in Israel is temporary, the Ministry of
the Interior adopted a “no-family” policy towards migrant guest-workers.179
Migrant workers can enter the country on a guest-worker visa only if they
do not have a close family member (spouse, parent or child)180 who is also
a guest-worker in Israel. Similarly, if two migrant workers get married in
Israel, one of them is required to leave the country,181 and if a woman gives
birth to a child she must leave the country with the newborn within twelve
weeks of the birth and will be able to return to Israel, for the remaining
period of her visa only if she returns alone.182 While this policy aims to
ensure that migrant workers do not settle in Israel it also minimizes the
social services the population of documented migrant workers requires.
Because, formally, no children, elderly, or disabled people are part of this
population, the major social provisions this population requires are related
to temporary housing and health services to an adult (and generally
healthy) population.
Another characteristic of the Israeli guest worker arrangement is that
most workers incur great debt in order to travel to Israel. Israeli manpower
agencies use recruiters (middlemen and employment agencies) in the
countries of origin that often promise the worker high wages and, in return,
demand high fees for their services and provide high interest loans for
workers to cover their travel expenses.183 A survey done by an Israeli NGO
showed that workers usually pay their recruiters a fee that ranges from
179. See generally THE 14TH KNESSET, PROTOCOL OF THE KNESSET COMMITTEE FOR
FOREIGN
WORKERS
PROTOCOL
(Nov.
3,
2004),
http://www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/data/html/zarim/2004-11-03.html (in Hebrew)
(discussing the problems associated with Israel’s immigration policy regarding foreign
workers who become pregnant and have children while residing in the country); HANI
BEN-YISRAEL & ODED FELER, LOVE HAS NO COUNTRY (2006) (in Hebrew),
http://www.kavlaoved.org.il/UserFiles/news75_file.DOC
(offering a critique of
Israel’s restrictive family policy towards migrant guest-workers).
180. See Entry to Israel Law 5712-1952 §12 (Isr.).
181. See generally BEN-YISRAEL & FELER, supra note 179 (outlining Israel’s
immigration regime concerning non-Jewish migrant workers who marry in Israel).
182. See HCJ 11437/05 Kav LaOved v. Minister of the Interior [2009] 2 (Isr.)
(challenging Israel’s treatment of pregnant migrant workers and requesting an
injunction to allow migrant women who give birth in Israel to remain in the country
with their children for the duration of their visa); see also MINISTRY OF INTERIOR,
Procedure for Treatment of a Pregnant Migrant Worker and a Migrant Worker that
Gave Birth in Israel, Procedure 5.3.0023 (Aug. 1, 2009), available at
http://www.moin.gov.il/Apps/PubWebSite/publications.nsf/All/B96025D3EC6D1EA9
422570AD00463773/$FILE/Publications.3.0023-1.8.2009.pdf?OpenElement
(in
Hebrew) [hereinafter Procedure for Treatment].
183. See Ruth Sinai, New System Expected to Help Protect Thai Workers From
Exploitation,
HAARETZ,
Apr.
18,
2008,
available
at
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/974146.html (reporting that Israel entered into a
contract with the International Organization of Migration (IOM) and the government of
Thailand to run an experiment in which all Thai migrant workers will be recruited by
the IOM and pay recruitment minimal fees to combat the debt bondage phenomenon).
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$2,000 to $15,000, depending on the country of origin.184 These fees are
eventually split between agencies in the country of origins and Israeli
manpower agencies. However, the wage actually paid to migrant workers
at times is below what they were promised and below the legal minimum
wage standard, making it difficult for them to repay their debt and reducing
their ability to exit the Israeli labor market without harsh consequences.185
The combination of reduced bargaining power of documented migrant
workers in the Israeli labor market (first through the binding system, and
then through the sector-binding system), the high debts migrants often
incur to travel to Israel, and the “no family” policy creates plenty of
incentives for migrant workers to violate the conditions of their visa and
remain in Israel “illegally.” Although leaving an employer—due to better
employment options, abuse, or any other reason—or switching
employment sectors will cost the worker her legal status in Israel, many
workers opt to take the risk and leave their legal employers for better
employment conditions elsewhere in Israel.186 Accordingly, an inadvertent
result of the care worker visa regime was the creation of another
flourishing care market in Israel—that of low-wage, undocumented nannies
and domestic workers.187 With the lowering costs of domestic work many
middleclass families in Israel could now afford to pay a migrant worker to
do domestic work, or care for their children. As for the migrant workers—
such employment opportunities often provide them with a better income
and greater flexibility than working legally as in-home aides for an elderly
or disabled person.188
Under the Israeli immigration regime, when a worker violates her visa
conditions and becomes illegal, she frees herself from the states’ regulatory
mechanism and thus becomes at once freer as well as more vulnerable to
exploitation (due to the threat of deportation). The paradox of the Israeli

184. See HOTLINE FOR MIGRANT WORKERS, “FOR YOU WERE STRANGERS”: MODERN
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS IN ISRAEL 7, available at
http://www.hotline.org.il/english/pdf/For_you_were_strangers_2nd_edition_Eng.pdf.
185. See STATE COMPTROLLER AND OMBUDSMAN (ISRAEL), ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
STATE COMPTROLLER 45-46 (1999), available at http://www.mevaker.gov.il/
serve/showHtml.asp?id=133&bookid=162&frompage=3&direction=1&contentid=213
6&parentcid=2136&startpage=180&sw=1680&hw=980 (stating that foreign workers
often earn only thirty to forty percent of what an Israeli worker earns and that
exploitation of migrant workers is high, with up to seventy percent earning less than the
minimum wage).
186. See NGAI, supra note 79, at 146-47 (examining the Mexican Bracero workers
in the United States).
187. See Inter-Ministry Report, supra note 156, at 25 (explaining that the trend
toward a flourishing of the undocumented care market resulted from “the common
skills required for care work and domestic work and due to the temporary nature of
their employment by the person in need of care”).
188. See Mundlak & Shamir, supra note 40, at 171.
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immigration regime is that while undocumented migrant workers are
extremely vulnerable they are also, unlike documented migrant workers,
able to become part of immigrant communities and establish local social
ties.189 These socialization opportunities are fertile ground for grassroots
organization of migrants through which they can make legal and political
claims. As sociologist Zeev Rosenhek suggests:
By limiting both the contract workers’ incentives and access to social
resources necessary to establish associations, these terms of
incorporation severely restrict their ability to carry out autonomous
social action. In contrast, due to their illegal status, undocumented labor
migrants escape to a large extent the sphere of state control. As a
consequence their incorporation is conducted within a relatively open
social space that allows for accumulation of social resources and their
190
collective mobilization.
***

The three immigration regimes surveyed explored three different
approaches to the regulation of the immigration of care workers, as well as
some commonalities that exist in markets of care as secondary markets of
unskilled, mostly women, workers. The following subsection will map the
distributional outcomes that each of the regimes entails for documented
migrant workers and undocumented migrant workers as well as the
distributional outcomes of these regimes in relation to men and women in
households that employ migrant care workers.
B. Distributive analysis
The following pages map the distributional consequences of the three
different immigration regimes’ regulation of the migration of care workers.
This examination uses the five-pronged analytical framework developed in
Part III. The five elements that make the analytical framework are
examined in relation to documented and undocumented migrant workers. I
also discuss, though to a lesser extent, the distributive effects of the
immigration regime on the men and women (from different classes) who
employ migrant workers.191 The distributional impact of the immigration
189. See Zeev Rosenhek, The Politics of Claims-Making by Migrant Workers in
Israel, 25 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 575, 591 (1999) (suggesting that restrictive
ethno-national immigration regimes have had the unintended consequence of
encouraging opportunities for undocumented immigrants, and positioning them as
collective actors).
190. Id. at 590.
191. As suggested earlier, a complete analysis that relates to households in receiving
countries has to take into account the background rules of welfare, employment and
family law. I have explored those, using this distributive framework elsewhere. Here I
limit myself to the distributive effects that are the direct result of the immigration
regime. See Shamir, Between Home and Work, supra note 35, at 426-28; Shamir, State
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regimes on migrant workers’ families in sending countries is partially
discussed as well.192
The comparison here is modest in scope. It sets aside the question of the
net effect of global migration regimes on communities and economies in
the developing world and focuses on the effect of immigration regimes on
differently situated groups of migrant workers once they have already
migrated. I am interested in exploring how the three different regimes
affect different groups of migrant workers. The analysis explores which of
these immigration regimes best, if at all, fulfills the potential of migratory
labor as a means of redistribution from the global north to the global south,
focusing mostly on the working condition, benefit levels, and general
migratory experience of migrant workers themselves as a proxy for such
redistribution.193
1. United States
a. De-commodification
Except for temporary migration for the purpose of agricultural work,
there is no available legal way for unskilled migrant workers to enter the
United States.194 Accordingly, the vast majority of migrants that dominate
care markets are undocumented migrant workers. The immigration regime
detailed above in conjunction with a welfare regime that mostly excludes
undocumented migrants and employment law that to a large extent
excludes care workers, and to an even larger extent excludes undocumented
migrant workers, creates a condition that can be characterized as a high
level of commodification. First, as care workers they are already excluded

of Care, supra note 68, at 959-61.
192. This aspect is dealt with here only partially since the impact on the families in
sending countries heavily depends on welfare regimes and economic policies in the
countries of origin, and these are beyond the scope of this analysis. For a general
discussion of the significance of economic restructuring in the sending country to the
migration of care workers see Enloe, supra note 8, at 118-20.
193. There are immigration regimes—such as the Canadian one—that provide care
workers with the option of naturalization in the receiving country. These can be seen
as more radically redistributive. Alternatively, they can be seen as less committed to
redistribution since the migrant is then detached from her country of origin and
becomes a settler and a member of the receiving country. Such more inclusive regimes
are outside the scope of this research. For a discussion of the Canadian regime, see
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION MINISTRY, THE LIVE-IN CAREGIVER PROGRAM (2007),
available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/ENGLISH/work/caregiver/index.asp. For a critical
description of the program, see DAIVA K. STASIULIS & ABIGAIL B. BAKAN,
NEGOTIATING CITIZENSHIP: MIGRANT WOMEN IN CANADA AND THE GLOBAL SYSTEM
86-106 (2005); GERALDINE PRATT & THE PHILIPPINE WOMEN CTR., Is This Canada?:
Domestic Workers’ Experience in Vancouver, BC, in GENDER, MIGRATION, AND
DOMESTIC SERVICE 23-61 (Janet Henshall Momsen ed., 1999).
194. See Frederickson & Leveille, supra note 103, at 3.
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from many employment law protections such as the FLSA.195 Second, as
migrants they are excluded from welfare state benefits such as food stamps,
medical assistance, federal financial assistance programs, and TANFrelated benefits for at least their first five years in the United States.196
Furthermore, in the American liberal welfare state regime, care work for
dependent family members is largely not provided by the state,197 and
mostly left to private market contracting which is only partially subsidized
and regulated. By adopting a market-centered approach towards the
provision of care services, the United States creates demand for cheap,
marketized care services. The high demand is met by the work of
undocumented migrant workers, yet the need of families is not
acknowledged by official policy, only, possibly, by the informal reality of
weak enforcement of employment rights, and the formal exclusion of care
workers from protective employment legislation. Third, as undocumented
migrants, even the legal protections of background rules that are
theoretically available to all (such as doctrines in contracts, tort, property,
and criminal law) are practically inaccessible due to the fear of deportation.
The legal regime therefore creates conditions of strong informality and
commodification.
A counterforce that operates to soften the effect of harsh
commodification is the relatively wide zone of toleration towards illegal
migration that exists in the U.S, coupled with a history and tradition of the
settlement of migrants.198 This allows the creation of large immigrant
communities, made up of veterans as well as newcomers that can provide
support networks to workers, as well as a setting for social mobilization
and organization.199 Access to these communities depends on countries of
195. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006) (excluding all in-home care workers in the
United States from coverage under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) which
protects the rights of employees to engage in collective bargaining by defining
“employee” as “any employee . . . but shall not include any individual employed . . . in
the domestic service of any family or person at his home . . .”); 29 U.S.C. § 213(15)
(2006) (excluding from the FLSA care workers who are employed on a casual basis in
domestic service employment to provide babysitting services or any employee
employed in domestic service to provide companionship services for individuals who
because of age or infirmity are unable to care for themselves); 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 (2009)
(defining companionship services in the Department of Labor regulations as household
work related to the care of an aged or infirm person); 29 C.F.R. § 1975.6 (2009)
(interpreting the Occupational Safety and Health Act to exclude domestic workers);
see also Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 167 (2007) (discussing
and affirming this exclusion); cf. Shamir, Between Home and Work, supra note 35, at
450-58.
196. Immigration Reform and Control Act, 8 U.S.C. §1255a(l) (2006).
197. See generally O’CONNOR ET AL., supra note 61 (evaluating the welfare
practices of the United States).
198. ALEJANDRO PORTES & RUBÉN G. RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA 40-49, 92102 (1990).
199. See Eunice Hunhye Cho, Immigrant Communities Building a Sustainable
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origin, individual connections and social capital, as well as geographic
location in the United States.
The unique in-home characteristic of care work affects the interface
between the workers and the legal regime in two ways. First, care workers
are rather invisible to the authorities since their work takes place in the
private sphere of the home, making them relatively protected from police
intervention in relation to other occupations that take place in public
spaces. Accordingly, in relation to other sectors in which many migrant
workers are employed, where raids on factories or fields are common,200
there is little chance for raids of individual households and, therefore, of
prosecution and deportation.201 However, the same “protection” of the
home becomes a risk factor since care workers’ isolation, away from the
public eye and in a supposedly less legal sphere of the private home,
enhances the power of their employers over them and makes them more
vulnerable to exploitation. Thus, perhaps paradoxically, the location of
their work at the “hearth” both relaxes and intensifies their
commodification depending on individual circumstances and employment
relationships.
The wide zone of toleration for illegal immigration allows an abundant
supply of undocumented migrant care workers who provide their services
at a relatively low price. This in turn allows the commodification and defamilialization of women and men in households that can afford to employ
migrant domestic workers. Because undocumented migrants tend to offer
the services at a lower price than local or documented workers,202 their
work becomes affordable not only to high-income households but also to
middle and some low-income households,203 thereby “freeing” both
spouses to engage in paid employment.

Movement in IMMIGRANT RIGHTS IN THE SHADOWS OF CITIZENSHIP 94, 100-08 (Rachel
Buff ed., 2008) (showing how this mobilization characterized the 2006 immigration
reform demonstrations in support of the proposed legislation H.R. 4437).
200. See Julia Preston, Illegal Workers Swept from Jobs in Silent Raids, N.Y. TIMES,
July 9, 2010 (detailing the recent “silent raids” adopted by the Obama Administration,
which have replaced the traditional immigration raids of factories and farms with
sending federal agents to audit companies’ records for illegal immigrant workers,
which would not be possible in the context of households).
201. See Marta Kindler, Risk and Risk Strategies in Migration: Ukrainian Domestic
Workers in Poland, in MIGRATION AND DOMESTIC WORK, supra note 6, at 145, 154.
202. Lora Jo Foo, The Vulnerable and Exploitable Immigrant Workforce and the
Need for Strengthening Worker Protective Legislation, 103 YALE L.J. 2179, 2212
(1994).
203. Liesel Schillinger, A Nanny Nightmare: Living Without One, N.Y. TIMES, May
27, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/27/fashion/27books.html (explaining that
“most nannies are not hired by socialites in white-glove buildings, but by cash-strapped
working women, who turn over to them a substantial portion (sometimes all) of their
earnings”).
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b. De-Familialization
Currently, the federal government is not considering creating a guest
workers visa program for care workers similar to the program that exists in
Canada, or for farm workers in the United States. This might not be wholly
bad for care workers given the harsh exploitation of migrant farm workers
under the guest worker visas today204 as well as under the Bracero Program
in the past.205 The United States fluctuates between two policy options, and
in a weak way tries to pursue both: creating an “amnesty” process for
illegal migrants in certain circumstances206 and strengthening border
control and enforcement of the immigration regime.207 In the public and
political debate about these options each one faces a classic objection that
makes its adoption a political challenge. Some see the amnesty option as
counterproductive and rewarding of illegal behavior. They fear that an
amnesty will create incentives for illegal migration.208 Others object to
strengthening the 2,000 mile long U.S.-Mexican border, due to the human
rights violations, and the landscape of fear and control such border
enhancement brings about.209
The relative stalemate in federal legislation that exists in relation to
illegal immigration has been interpreted by economist Barry Chiswik in a
1986 essay as “a rational short term response to a policy dilemma.”210 His
argument, translated to the language of the analytical framework used here,
is that what lies at the heart of U.S. immigration policy is a desire to defamilialize unskilled migrant workers:
We want foreign workers, but not their dependents. We allow illegal
migration but keep the probability of arrest and deportation high enough
to discourage the entry of family members . . . because we want workers
but not their dependents, and as we find it awkward to say so openly we
perpetuate a cat-and-mouse game between the immigration authorities
211
and illegal aliens.
204. DAVID CRAIG GRIFFITH, AMERICAN GUEST-WORKERS: JAMAICANS AND
MEXICANS IN THE U.S. LABOR MARKET 39-44 (2006).
205. Robert Mayer, Guestworkers and Exploitation, 67 REV. POL. 311 (2005).
206. Susan Gonzales Baker, The “Amnesty” Aftermath: Current Policy Issues
Stemming from the Legalization Programs of the 1986 Immigration Reform and
Control Act, 31 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 5, 7-9 (1997).
207. PETER ANDREAS, BORDER GAMES: POLICING THE U.S.-MEXICO DIVIDE 3-15
(2001).
208. JIM GILCHRIST & JEROME R. CORSI, MINUTEMEN: THE BATTLE TO SECURE
AMERICA’S BORDERS 69 (2006).
209. JOSEPH NEVINS, OPERATION GATEKEEPER: THE RISE OF THE “ILLEGAL ALIEN”
AND THE MAKING OF THE U.S. MEXICO BOUNDARY 140-44 (2001).
210. Barry Chiswick, The Illegal Alien Policy Dilemma, in ESSAYS ON LEGAL AND
ILLEGAL MIGRATION 76 (Susan Pozo ed., 1986).
211. Id.
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Chiswick’s is an interesting hypothesis. By keeping a steady stream of
undocumented immigrants entering the country, but making their lives
unstable enough so as to deter settlements of families, the United States
reaches the goal achieved by guest-worker visas such as the Israeli one
without conceding the instrumental, commodifying aspect of the regime.
The problem with Chiswick’s hypothesis is that this is not necessarily the
effect on all workers. In fact, it turns out—as the post-Bracero Program
lessons as well as the Israeli case show—that illegal migrants are much less
easy to control than legal ones.
Undocumented migrants often migrate with an initial intention of a
temporary stay, but some stay longer and some permanently. Immigrants
who stay for a long period of time might eventually bring their families, or
form families in the United States. This is the process in which many of
the immigrant communities in the United States were originally formed.212
If this is the case then the “de-familialization” hypothesis is at least
partially wrong since illegality does not deter all family formation.
Moreover, it turns out that strengthening border security might in fact
encourage long-term settlement rather than deter it, because those who
entered will not risk going back.213 And indeed, studies show that the
passage of IRCA—that criminalized the employment illegal migrant
workers—increased the migration of whole family units as well as informal
family reunification migration.214
The effect of the legal immigration regime on actual immigration is,
therefore, not straightforward. The U.S. immigration regime bears
different effects on different groups of migrants from different backgrounds
with different inclinations towards risk taking. Moreover, it depends on
one’s migratory stage. In this respect it can be generalized that, in their
first period of migration, unskilled migrant workers tend to migrate alone,
and, once their earnings and confidence grow (due to the wide zone of
toleration allowing them to stay), their families may follow, or they may
create a family in the United States.
The discussion so far is not unique to care workers. But the situation of
care workers is perhaps particularly de-familializing.215 Live-in care
212. PORTES & RUMBAUT, supra note 198, at 40-43.
213. Michael Piore, Can International Migration Be Controlled?, in ESSAYS ON

LEGAL AND ILLEGAL MIGRATION, supra note 210, at 21, 41.
214. Doreen Mattingly, Making Maids: United States Immigration Policy and
Immigration Domestic Workers, in GENDER, MIGRATION, AND DOMESTIC SERVICE 61,
66 (Janet Henshall Momsen ed., 1999) (stating that IRCA “increased the cost and risks
of crossing the border, which has discouraged the pattern of male cyclical migration,
and encouraged workers already in the United States to settle there, often bringing their
families north”).
215. I say “perhaps” because there are other employment arrangements that are
common among migrant workers and require a form of on-site accommodation, such as
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workers are, by definition, required to live away from their own
households. Therefore, migrant care workers are more likely, at least as
long as they are live-ins, to leave their families behind. Studies show that
this de-familialization is one of the reasons employers prefer to employ
migrant care workers.216 The live-in arrangement has the downside of
reducing the worker’s control over her schedule, enhancing her employer’s
authority and subjecting the worker to social isolation. However, many
new immigrants prefer this arrangement because it dramatically reduces
living expenses. Anthropologist Rhacel Parreñas, who interviewed Filipina
domestic workers in Los Angeles, noted: “none of them would consider
part time work because the living expenses incurred in such an arrangement
would result in lesser remittances for their families in the Philippines
and/or lesser savings.”217 However, once migrant care workers consider
settling in the United States, they tend to move to live-out employment
arrangements and settle in households of their own.218 It therefore seems
that the strong informality associated with illegal migration of care workers
tends to lead to de-familialization in the early stages of migration, or in
cases of temporary migration, but does not necessarily create the over-all
de-familializing effect that guest-worker regimes ensure.
For those care workers who arrive at the United States unmarried, the
option of attaining permanent residency through marriage to an American
citizen is a compelling one.219 This can be seen as creating an incentive
towards marriage with American citizens or legal residents. In a similar
vein the regime incentivizes family creation through the jus soli rule: the
rule the guarantees citizenship to those born on American soil.220 While an
illegal immigrant who gives birth in the United States does not become a
citizen herself, her child does, and, once the child turns twenty one, through
family reunification she can possibly begin her own (albeit very
complicated) road towards naturalization.221 Accordingly, byproducts of
the regime can be inclusion and incentives towards familialization rather
than exclusion and de-familialization.
Moreover, the question of familialization is revealed as highly
complicated if we are willing to entertain the idea that leaving one’s family
certain construction jobs and farm work.
216. CHANG, supra note 8, at 55-59.
217. PARREÑAS 2001, supra note 13, at 160.
218. Id. at 233-35.
219. See Guillermina Jasso & Mark R. Rosenzweig, THE NEW CHOSEN PEOPLE:
IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 212 (1990).
220. FROM MIGRANTS TO CITIZENS: MEMBERSHIP IN A CHANGING WORLD 123-29 (T.
Alexander Aleinkoff & Douglas Klusmeyer eds., 2000).
221. Monique Lee Hawthorne, Family Unity in Immigration Law: Broadening the
Scope of “Family”, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 809, 814-17 (2007).
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need not be, in itself, a clear-cut form of de-familialization, but,
paradoxically, can also express a very deep form of familialization
manifested by one’s willingness to sacrifice oneself for one’s family.
Under this theory, work migration does not express attraction to the United
States, but rather commitment to the migrants’ original community and
family. As economist Michael Piore suggests, many migrants find
American culture “cold and alien, strange, lonely, and frightening.”222
Their reason for migration is not to settle but rather to achieve a concrete
goal and improve their family’s material conditions in the country of
origin.223
This perspective on familialization and de-familialization challenges
traditional views about care, motherhood, and gender roles in parenting.
For example, in their discussion of mother-worker identities of care
workers in Europe, Williams and Gavanas note that,
in London cultural practices around childcare often did not align with
those who were actually doing childcare. ‘Being a good mother’ meant
different things for different employees and their employers. For
domestic workers with children, being a good mother meant being a
good provider, working to send money home so that their children might
224
have better education.

However, they also note that some of the care workers “hold traditional
ideas about the needs of young children.”225 Rhacel Parreñas’s study of
transnational motherhood similarly suggests that for many migrant workers
and their children, the effect of migration can be difficult, but cannot be
summed up as clear “de-familialization.” She says:
Like Ellen’s [a child she interviewed] mother, who managed to ‘be there’
despite a vast distance, other migrant mothers do not necessarily
‘abandon’ their traditional duty of nurturing their families. Rather, they
provide emotional care and guidance from afar. Ellen even credits her
mother for her success in school . . . Ellen can acknowledge the
sacrifices her mother made and the hardships she has endured in order to
226
be a ‘good provider’ for her family.

We should not ignore the fact that family separation for a long period of
time can be difficult, at times harmful, and bear a cost to both the migrant
and her family members who remain back home. However, it suggests that
222. Piore, supra note 213, at 27.
223. Id. at 27-28. But see Brian Wampler et al., Should I Stay or Should I Go?

Explaining Why Most Mexican Immigrants Are Choosing to Remain Permanently in
the United States, 7 LATINO STUD. 83 (2009) (analyzing the reasons that most
undocumented Mexican farm workers plan to stay in the United States permanently).
224. Williams & Gavanas, supra note 41, at 21.
225. Id.
226. Parreñas 2002, supra note 53, at 43, 47.
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this is not all that the migration experience entails.227 This perspective on
migration challenges us to rethink ideas about motherhood and gender,
entertaining the possibility that, despite the cost and the transformation of
the family unit, mothers who are migrant workers may decide that the cost
is worth the sacrifice and that perhaps it does not include giving up their
motherhood and their families.
The effect of the U.S. immigration regime on American families is that it
allows commodification and de-familialization of women in families that
can afford to employ a migrant care worker. In this sense, it can be argued
the de-familialization, the labor market participation, and generally the
greater equality achieved by many American women is attained through the
parallel ‘de-familialization’ of migrant workers.228 However, as the
analysis above implies, neither elements of this claim, the beneficial effect
on middle-class American women nor the harm to immigrant workers,
proves to be accurate and straightforward.
In sum, the U.S. immigration regime, in which the immigration of care
workers is not regulated and legalized, but rather occurs in the shadow of
the law and, yet, is widely tolerated, has complex effects on migrant
workers’ de-familialization levels. While some suggest that the toleration
of the illegality of unskilled workers reflects an informal American policy
towards de-familialization and commodification of migrant workers, the
large immigrant communities in the United States suggest that this is not
the only outcome of the regime. The regime has different effects on defamilialization at different stages of the immigration process, and it
depends on the individual migrant’s tendencies towards settlement. The
lack of a documented framework for migration of unskilled workers, and
the resulting absence of governmental supervision of undocumented
migrant workers opens for some care workers the possibility to adopt liveout work arrangements and bring their families and/or raise families in the
United States. However, this is not an option open to all workers, and in
the case of many care workers who cannot bring their families to the
United States (due to financial or cultural reasons as well as risk aversion),
the effect of the regime is indeed, as Chiswick suggested, strong de227. Id. at 40-41.

Id.

The children I spoke to certainly had endured emotional hardships; but . . .
they did not all experience their mother’s migration as abandonment. The
hardships in their lives were frequently diminished when they received support
from extended families and communities, when they enjoyed open
communication with their migrant parents, and when they clearly understood
the limited financial options that led their parents to migrate in the first place.

228. CHANG, supra note 8, at 58 (describing how “the advances of many middleclass white women in the workforce have been largely predicated on the exploitation of
poor immigrant women”).
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familialization. However, if we are willing to entertain conceptions of
transnational motherhood that challenge traditional views of care and
motherhood, our analysis of the regime’s de-familializing effect might
change. Then we might accept the possibility that migrant workers’
migration does not necessarily break, but merely changes, family ties as
well as gender roles and expectations in families.
c. Stratification
Perhaps the most straightforward consequence of the U.S. immigration
regime is its stratifying effect. The barriers unskilled workers have to
overcome to work in the United States legally create a stratified market that
disadvantages undocumented migrants. One of the documented byproducts
of the passage of IRCA in 1986 was lower wages, worsened working
conditions, and increased economic and legal vulnerability of
undocumented immigrants.229 Undocumented workers occupy a weak
bargaining position not only in their relationships with employers, but also
in relation to other actors; it makes it difficult to obtain protections from the
abuses of landlords, moneylenders, or even neighbors and coworkers, all of
whom can turn them in to the authorities.230 In relation to the job market
and their economic options, IRCA reduced the employment opportunities
open to undocumented migrants, channeling them into secondary market
jobs where employers take advantage of their limited bargaining options.231
For women, one of the main occupations that remained open was care work
because of the high level of informality that characterizes the whole
industry and because it takes place in private homes, away from the public
eye. Moreover, IRCA limits the ability of undocumented migrant women
to move from care work to other jobs, turning care work into an
occupational ghetto232 and barring movement of undocumented migrants
from secondary to primary market jobs.233
This stratification, however, is not only between undocumented migrants
and all others. The effect is a deeper stratification of the economy,
enhancing the differences between the secondary and the primary labor
markets since the lowered wages and working conditions of undocumented
immigrant workers lower, to some extent, the wages and working
conditions provided to citizens and residents employed in the secondary
229. Mattingly, supra note 214, at 70.
230. Tisha R. Tallmant, Liberty, Justice, and Equality: An Examination of Past,

Present, and Proposed Immigration Policy Reform Legislation, 30 N.C. J. INT’L L. &
COM. REG. 869, 873-78 (2005).
231. Piore, supra note 213, at 28-29.
232. Mattingly, supra note 214, at 69.
233. María Enchautegui, The Job Quality of U.S. Immigrants, 47 INDUSTRIAL REL.
108, 109, 111-13 (2008).
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market as well, and, in certain cases, even price them out of the job market
altogether.234 Although there is little data regarding these effects in relation
to care work, it is conceivable that the effect of the availability of cheap
and vulnerable migrant care workers is dual: first, deep stratification within
the care industry between care services purchased by high income
households on the one hand and medium/low income households on the
other;235 and second, enhanced class stratification by pushing former care
workers out of the labor market.236
d. Intra-Household Division of Labor
In those cases in which migrant care workers leave behind families of
their own,237 one expected scenario resulting from a woman’s migration
could be the increased role of men in caring for the family left behind (if
they themselves did not migrate for work purposes).238 However, gender
ideologies prove in many cases to be resistant to this kind of reversal, even
under the pressure of female work migration. Studies show that in most
cases the care responsibility is transferred not to the husband, father, or
another male, but to the oldest daughter or another female family member,
or into the hands of a local paid care worker.239 Accordingly, the work
migration of care workers, in most cases, does not bring about change in
the gender division of labor in households in sending countries.
234. In the debates over immigration, it is commonly argued that even if
immigration is beneficial to some, the gain is at the expense of low-skilled workers
who compete directly for jobs. See an overview of the debate in Susan Pozo, The Many
Guises of Immigration Reform, in ESSAYS ON LEGAL AND ILLEGAL MIGRATION, supra
note 210, at 1-6.
235. See Orly Lobel, Care and Class: The Roles of Private Intermediaries in the InHome Care Industry in the United States and Israel, 24 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 89, 91
(2001) (describing U.S. care market stratification in the context of child-care and
suggesting that employment agencies are involved in “a relatively small, yet clearly
patterned, percentage of the careworker market, referring high-end, white American
nannies, while migrant women are hired mostly through word-of-mouth referrals or
through lower-tier domestic work agencies”).
236. In some other low-skilled and unskilled jobs it is claimed that Latinos are
taking over the jobs of African-Americans. See Daniel B. Wood, Rising Black-Latino
Clash on Jobs, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 25, 2006, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0525/p01s03-ussc.html. It should be noted that an
exact relationship between the presence of immigrants and the loss of black jobs has
not been clearly proven in research. See George Borjas, Immigrants and the U.S.
Labor Market, in ESSAYS ON LEGAL AND ILLEGAL MIGRATION, supra note 210, at 1520. However, in the case of care work, originally the scenario was one of substitution
rather than internal competition or complementarity. Today, when the market is
dominated by migrant care workers, new waves of immigrants might be competing
with ‘veteran’ immigrants on care work jobs.
237. Leaving behind family upon migration is common for both documented and
undocumented migrant care workers. In fact this description is suitable for all three
jurisdictions in this study.
238. Gamburd, supra note 55, at 190, 200-06.
239. PARREÑAS 2005, supra note 53; Gamburd, supra note 55.
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In the households in which migrant care workers work, they “help
women to undo gender in the realm of their daily gender performances.”240
The migrant worker fills the role of the “housewife” (only often with
considerably less discretion as to how to perform her job) and frees her
employers to pursue gainful employment.
The common narrative about migrant care workers is that, by the care
work of women from the global south, women from the global north can
reach greater economic, political, and social equality. While this is
undoubtedly the case, this is also not the whole story. Women employers
are often still responsible for household operations even if they do not have
to do domestic chores themselves. Studies of the relationships between
care workers and their employers show that the main interaction is between
the worker and the woman head of household. The mothers (and not the
fathers) tend to maintain supervision and control over the care workers’
work and often see the care workers as competitors to their own roles as
mothers and wives.241 This suggests that gender role patterns, according to
which women are responsible for care giving (emotional and menial), are
not broken. Furthermore, even if the woman employer sees herself freed
from any undesirable care work, the fact that it is another woman who
takes on her job implies that this is not a gender revolution; rather, it is a
reiteration of class and race inequalities. The significant change is that the
physical burden of care is redistributed between women of different
classes/ethnicities, freeing the better-off ones to participate in paid labor.
This, therefore, also affects men, who now enjoy greater household income
as well as a well-ordered home, but because, to begin with, men are
expected to do less in the household the effect on the time men spend on
household chores is relatively marginal.
e. Material Delivery
The analysis so far has made it clear that the U.S. regime renders migrant
care workers generally more vulnerable than citizen and resident care
workers.242 The immigration regime depresses the wages of undocumented
workers by making their employment illegal and putting their employers at
risk of fines. The regime enhances the bargaining power of employers by
reducing the employment opportunities available to undocumented
240. Lutz, Introduction, supra note 6, at 6.
241. JUDITH ROLLIN, BETWEEN WOMEN: DOMESTICS AND THEIR EMPLOYERS (1986);

Roberts, supra note 36, at 52.
242. It is important to note that it is not clear that the situation of undocumented
migrant workers would have been worse under a guest-worker visa regime. As the
Israeli example shows, legality does not necessarily entail reduced vulnerability and
better working conditions. In fact, while an illegal status increases vulnerability it also
increases market mobility.
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migrants. It leads migrants into a precarious social position in which
anyone with whom they have contact can engender their deportation, thus
increasing their vulnerability in any transaction or relationship they
conduct. The U.S. regime has dire effects on the lives of unskilled,
undocumented migrant workers in comparison to the situation of skilled
workers who experience a significantly less risky migratory experience.
However, another point of comparison aside from the immigration
regime designed for skilled workers is the enforcement of the existing
immigration regime. If we are willing to assume that work migration
improves the situation of some migrant workers in relation to remaining in
their countries of origin, then, in some cases, the wide zone of toleration for
illegal migration that characterizes the U.S. immigration regime may yield
some positive outcomes. Undocumented migrant workers can enter the
United States (though often at great risk), and although their status is
precarious, they can potentially make more money in the United States than
in their country of origin, and, if they do not fall victim to wage
withholding or other exploitative work conditions, then they may find the
immigration experience personally and financially rewarding, favoring
their upward social mobility in their country of origin or, in some cases, in
the United States.243 Moreover, on a wider scale, remittances of migrant
care workers are a significant part of their countries’ and/or communities’
economy, providing what can be seen as paths for the redistribution of
wealth from the global north to the global south.
This redistributive effect of immigration does not justify or excuse the
vulnerability and high level of risk that characterizes work migration into
the United States under the current immigration regime. However, this
element of the regime should be kept in mind when developing restrictive
reform strategies that aim to protect the local and documented migrant
workers. Restrictions on immigration of care workers may, by themselves,
end up harming migrant workers rather than helping them.244 Moreover,
creating legal paths of temporary migration, such as the Israeli guestworker visa regime, is another route of reform that entails great costs to the
workers. Accordingly, both restrictive reforms and regulative reforms must
be attuned to the realities of informal and secondary labor markets, and to
the effects of regulation on migrant women’s bargaining power.
The material effect on local workers is less clear cut. While there is
agreement that the low wages of undocumented workers ripple through the

243. PARREÑAS 2001, supra note 13, at 197 (discussing contradictory class
mobility); ROMERO, supra note 19, at 13 (discussing the flexibility and financial
benefits in domestic work).
244. Sassen, supra note 73, at 2 (discussing the harmful effect of immigration
restrictions in Europe).
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economy, they translate, on the one hand, to (somewhat) lower wages for
unskilled workers, and, on the other, to cheaper goods and services.245
Alternative policies that will alter the practice of partial enforcement, such
as tighter border control and stricter employer inspection, will not
necessarily improve the position of local workers. The first may translate
into heavier taxes and/or budget cuts, and the second may act as an
“employer tax” that will increase hiring costs. Moreover, reduction in the
availability of migrant work (if these other two policies are pursued) will
increase the cost of care work, assuming there are no domestic care
workers willing to do the job for the same price. The effect of enforcement
of the formal immigration regime therefore depends on whether local care
workers can substitute for migrant ones. If local care workers will be more
expensive, any enforcement of the immigration regime will have harsh
effects on middle- and low-income two income households, which will not
be able to afford the purchase of care services.246
2. Australia
Australia’s prohibitive immigration regime vís-a-vís unskilled workers
means that Australia’s care market is not built on a migrant workforce, but
rather on the work of local care workers.247 Accordingly, the Australian
immigration regime (like the U.S. regime barring the work migration of
care workers, but unlike the United States managing to enforce this regime
relatively successfully) is an important background rule that shapes the
market, but is not a direct distributive instrument.
Welfare and
employment law shape the distribution within markets of care in Australia.
In Australia, care workers are formally fully protected by protective
employment legislation, with the exception of protection from some
unlawful (discriminatory) dismissal legislation.248 The combination of the
general applicability of employment protections to in-home care workers,
and the prohibitive immigration regime, creates a small market of in-home
care work, and even a smaller market of live-in care workers, afforded
mostly by higher income families, while other families use familial care or
group care solutions (and are encouraged by welfare benefits and tax

245. Howard F. Chang, The Disadvantages of Immigration Restriction as a Policy to
Improve Income Distribution, 61 SMU L. REV. 23, 28-32 (2008).
246. Id. at 43-44.
247. Fact Sheet 87, supra note 139 (reporting that in 2009, there were 48,700
undocumented migrants in Australia who had entered legally but over-stayed their
visas).
248. See Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) S 14(3) (Austl.); Disability
Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) S 15(3) (Austl.) (excluding domestic workers’ from
anti-discrimination legislation).
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incentives to do so).249
The high cost of child-care is balanced by targeted child-care subsidies
to low-income families, and the clear policy push towards day care centers,
rather than live-in arrangements.250 This structure of the care market
allows low-income households to access quality child-care.251 The
Australian system creates a less stratified child-care market both for clients
and for the workers themselves.
The outcome of the immigration regime is a smaller, more expensive
market of in-home paid care (less people can afford it, reduced demand),252
with less vulnerable workers,253 complemented by a large market of daycare centers partially subsidized through welfare benefits and tax policy.254
Since immigration law does not act as a significant distributive tool within
markets of care in Australia, the following discussion will only designate
the contours of the effects of the regime on making the care market a
domestic one.
a. De-Commodification and De-Familialization
The Australian unwillingness to create an immigration framework for
unskilled workers suggests commitment to de-commodification of care
workers, at least within its territory. As the discussion of the regime in the
United States implied, opening the market to migrant workers (documented
and undocumented) often translates to deep commodification of the
migrant workforce.255 By avoiding the creation of a migrant, under-class of
249. Janeen Baxter et al., Who Uses Paid Domestic Labor in Australia? Choice and
Constraint in Hiring Household Help, 15 FEMINIST ECON. 1, 6-8, 19-21 (2009)
(examining how a family’s decision to pay for care work and domestic work is
determined not only by the household’s resources and market structure but also by
attitudes towards paid domestic work).
250. Deborah Brennan, Babies, Budgets, and Birthrates: Work/Family Policy in
Australia 1996–2006, 14 SOC. POL. 1, 45-46 (2007).
251. Id. at 46.
252. Hugo, supra note 127, at 200-01.
253. Michael Lyons, Who Cares? Child-Care, Trade Unions and Staff Turnover, 38
J. OF INDUS. REL. 629, 630-32 (1996) (discussing levels of unionization and work
conditions of Australian care workers by pointing out that while in Australia care
workers are part of the secondary labor market, they are characterized as a relatively
strong labor force that is made up mostly of Australian citizens and residents, that are,
to some extent, unionized).
254. Brennan, supra note 250, at 46.
255. Arguably this does not have to be the case. It is easy to imagine a nonexploitative immigration regime—visas for skilled workers are an example of that.
However, the country’s interest in inviting skilled workers is the added skill they bring
with them. The reason to invite unskilled workers is their labor power, provided at a
price that domestic workers do not agree to work for. Accordingly, it seems that an
immigration regime that offers unskilled migrant workers commodification levels on a
par with that of the domestic workforce has economic justification only when there are
no laborers in the country that the migrant are substituting. This is the case in early
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care workers, Australian policy maintains a relatively stable level of decommodification of its local care workers.
The unavailability of a cheap migrant workforce means that the
Australian care market, in itself, is not a strong de-familializing instrument.
However, Australian welfare policy256 somewhat counterbalances this
effect by way of welfare benefits and tax breaks to low-income families,
thus managing to somewhat de-familialize women257 without reliance on a
migrant workforce of care workers.
In Australia, care workers are fully protected by protective employment
legislation. The result is a small market of in-home care work, and even a
smaller market of live-in care workers, afforded mostly by higher income
families, while other families use familial care or group care solutions (and
are encouraged by welfare benefits and tax incentives to do so). The result
is weaker de-familialization of women primary market workers (and men,
to the extent that men are affected by de-familialization instruments).258
What is effect on “foreign” women who, because of the Australian
policy, did not become migrants? It can be argued, that by barring
entrance, the effect is stronger familialization. However, there are too
many open variables to hypothesize with confidence that a potential
migrant who is disbarred from entering Australia might either end up
migrating to another country or might have to accept a highly
commodifying job in her country of origin. The distributional effect in this
respect is therefore difficult to assess.
b. Stratification
The regulation of child-care providers, coupled with the employment of
mainly Australian nationals in the Australian care market, significantly
increases the cost of care.259 This, in turn, leads to a somewhat stratified
market of care; in a private child-care market various qualities of services
settler communities. It is difficult to imagine such a situation today.
256. See generally STANDING COMM. ON FAMILY & HUMAN SERV., PARLIAMENT OF
THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., BALANCING WORK AND FAMILY 179 (2005),
available
at
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/fhs/workandfamily/report/
reportfinal.pdf [hereinafter BALANCING WORK AND FAMILY].
257. JOANNA ABHAYARATNA & RALPH LATTIMORE, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T,
PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, WORKFORCE PARTICIPATION RATES—HOW DOES AUSTRALIA
COMPARE 29-30 (2007) (showing an above average labor market participation rate for
women in relation to other OECD countries, but lower levels of participation of childbearing aged women (twenty five to forty four years), where Australia ranked 8th
lowest).
258. BALANCING WORK AND FAMILY, supra note 256.
259. OECD,
SOCIETY
AT
A
GLANCE:
CHILDCARE
COSTS,
http://puck.sourceoecd.org/vl=5395207/cl=27/nw=1/rpsv/society_glance/11.htm (last
visited Aug. 6, 2010) (reporting data on out-of-pocket costs to families of purchasing
centre-based childcare).
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exist and the highest quality day-care will be unavailable to middle and low
income families. However, unlike the deep stratification that characterizes
the U.S. care market, in Australia care services—day care and in-home care
—are regulated for quality and safety.260 Therefore, the “floor” of day-care
quality in the Australian market, i.e. the type of child-care low-income
families can afford, is higher than it would have been in a non-regulated
market.
The Australian care market has relatively low levels of stratification,
since there is no cheap migrant labor force that lowers wage standards and
most employment protections apply to care workers. Yet, it should be
noted that though the workforce is “legal,” care work remains a secondary
market occupation in Australia. Care work jobs are relatively low paying,
insecure, and often do not include career advancement. As a result care
workers remain a vulnerable and under-protected group of workers, in
relation to other sectors of the Australian labor market.261
c. Intra-Household Division of Labor (IHDOL)
The fact that marketized care services are relatively expensive and that
the ones available offer less flexibility (day-care centers compared with inhome care) mean that the immigration regime does not help to challenge
traditional IHDOL realities.262 However, as the discussion of the situation
in the United States showed, the availability of cheap care services might
free women to participate in the labor market, but it does not necessarily
lead to transformation and equalization of IHDOL; in households with inhome care work women are still most likely to be the ones responsible for
care work and for taking care of the household.
d. Material Delivery
The Australian immigration policy that prevents the creation of an
under-class of migrant workers has much moral gravitas. However, this
position has been heavily criticized by the Pacific states, which constitute

260. NAT’L ASS’N OF CHILD CARE RESOURCE AND REFERRAL AGENCIES, LEAVING
CHILDREN TO CHANCE: NACCRRA’S RANKING OF STATE STANDARDS AND OVERSIGHT
OF
SMALL FAMILY CHILD CARE HOMES
(2008),
available
at
http:www.issuu.com/naccrra/docs/leaving-childrentochance?mode=embed
&layout=white; NAT’L ASS’N OF CHILD CARE RESOURCE & REFERRAL AGENCIES, WE
CAN DO BETTER: 2009 UPDATE: NACCRRA’S RANKING OF STATE CHILD CARE
CENTER REGULATIONS AND OVERSIGHT 17-21 (2009) (portraying the relatively low
regulatory standard setting in the United States); Emma Rush, Child Care Quality in
Australia (The Austl. Inst., Discussion Paper No. 84) 9-15 (2006).
261. Lyons, supra note 253, at 643-44.
262. One indicator for this is the relatively large labor market participation gap in
Australia of women in child bearing age. See ABHAYARATNA & LATTIMORE, supra note
257, at 30, 49.
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Australia’s less economically developed neighbors. The Pacific states have
been urging Australia, as early as the 1960s, to open its borders to unskilled
work, in hope that remittances will support their struggling economies.263
The economic situation in these countries is dire. The Asian Development
Bank described the situation of the Pacific countries in the following way:
[T]ypically they are small isolated communities, endowed with few
natural resources, comprising of many smaller islands and atolls which
often suffer from a lack of geographical proximity to one another. A
direct result of this isolation is that a disproportionate share of total
income is spent on communication, administration and transport. A
narrow production base exacerbated by the declining terms of trade in
Pacific Island agricultural commodities, failures to successfully diversify
economically, significant diseconomies of scale (due to incredibly small
domestic markets), and an inability to compete effectively in the global
264
marketplace, have resulted in large trade deficits.

While remittances could be very helpful to these economies (Tonga and
Fiji are examples of economies that rely on remittances with some level of
success) and alleviate severe poverty,265 their sustainability and long-term
positive effects are debatable. However, at least in the short run, there is
agreement that remittances can be a useful form of aid for the struggling
economies of the Pacific.
Australia’s refusal to open up to unskilled workers by establishing a
temporary guest-worker regime therefore prevents the exploitation of
migrant labor but at the same time blocks the potential for redistribution of
wealth from Australia to Pacific states.
3. Israel
a. De-Commodification
Formally, the Israeli guest worker regime for care workers does not
appear particularly commodifying in regard to documented migrant care
workers. According to “the law on the books” care workers theoretically
enjoy working conditions on par with those of Israeli workers; they enjoy
the same employment protections (care workers are excluded from
263. Millbank, Seasonal Guest Worker, supra note 124.
264. Terrie Walmsley et al., The Impact of Liberalizing Labour Mobility in the

Pacific Region 2 (Asian Dev. Bank, Pac. Studies Series, Working Paper No. 17, 2005),
available
at
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/Pacific-Regionalism/vol3/
wp17.pdf.
265. Manjula Luthria et al., At Home and Away: Expanding Job Opportunities for
Pacific
Islanders
through
Labour
Mobility,
THE
WORLD
BANK,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFIC
EXT/PACIFICISLANDSEXTN/0,,contentMDK:21020027~pagePK:141137~piPK:141
127~theSitePK:441883,00.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2010).
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overtime pay but theoretically this applies to Israeli workers as well),266
health care insurance, decent accommodations, and eligibility for various
social security benefits.267 The main difference between a migrant care
worker and a local one would appear to be the migrant’s limited ability to
switch occupations and the temporary nature of the migrant’s stay.
The “law in action” is where the commodifying effects of the Israeli
regime lie. Migrant care workers’ limited market power and restricted
market mobility (inability to move between sectors, and attachment to a
manpower agency), and until recently inability to switch employers (under
the now defunct binding system), coupled with the large debts many of
them incur in order to travel to Israel, render them highly vulnerable to
exploitation and highly dependent on their employers. Furthermore, due to
ineffective enforcement of employment protections, the guarantee of equal
employment conditions is illusory: care workers often receive below
minimum wage salaries,268 they have few vacation days, they are required
to work for long hours, and there are many reported cases of wage
withholding as well as passport confiscation by employers.269 The result,
in some cases, is deep commodification in which workers with restricted
options and alternatives are trapped in exploitative employment
relationships. Furthermore, because the work is done in-home the workers
are often isolated and have little or no relationships to people besides their
employers.270 This isolation translates into deep dependence on the
employer, and if this vulnerability is exploited the migrant worker often
does not know her rights, or to whom she can turn to assert them, and has
no social networks to provide support or indeed a way out. The worker can
turn to the manpower agency to which she is attached but, perhaps not
surprisingly, the agencies tend to side with employers and provide workers
with partial or inaccurate information about their rights and alternatives.271

266. HCJ 1678/07 Yolanda Gloten v. The Labor Court et al. (Nov. 29, 2009) (Isr.).
For a critical analysis of this opinion see Guy Mundlak & Hila Shamir, Bringing
Together or Drifting Apart? Targeting Domestic Work as “Work Like no Other”,
CANADIAN J. WOMEN & L. (forthcoming 2011).
267. See MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY TRADE & LABOR, STATE OF ISRAEL FOREIGN
WORKERS’ RIGHTS HANDBOOK (2009).
268. GILAD NATAN, THE KNESSET RES. & INFO. CTR, MIGRANT CARE WORKERS FOR
THE
SEVERELY
DISABLED
(2007),
available
at
http://www.knesset.gov.il/MMM/doc.asp?doc=m01942&type=doc (in Hebrew) (noting
that the average monthly wage of a migrant care worker is $750 a month).
269. MICHAEL ELLMAN & SMAIN LAACHER, MIGRANT WORKERS IN ISRAEL: A
CONTEMPORARY FORM OF SLAVERY 18 (2003).
270. Sedef Arat-Koc, In the Privacy of Our Own Home: Foreign Domestic Workers
as Solution to the Crisis in the Domestic Sphere in Canada, 28 STUD. POL. ECON. 33,
37 (1989) (discussing the solitary nature of migrant care and domestic work).
271. Lobel, supra note 235, at 120, 132.
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Of course this is not always the case.272 However, the structure of the
immigration regime enables and encourages isolation and vulnerability,
leading to deep commodification and dependence on employment for
survival.
The protections that are granted to migrant workers are structured in a
“privatized” way. The state itself is not a party or directly responsible for
any of the rights guaranteed; rather the regulation, supervision and
provision are delegated to the employers and to the manpower agencies.
The state avoids direct accountability by, for example, structuring the
provision of social services such as housing and health insurance as the
exclusive responsibility of the employer. As Rosenhek suggests:
[I]t seems that these regulations have been enacted only to protect the
state from potential claims against its lack of involvement regarding
the migrant workers’ living conditions. This is reflected in the
reluctance exhibited by the state apparatus to implement effective
control measures to guarantee that the employers fulfill their legal
273
obligations.

The structure of documented migration creates incentives for workers to
violate their visa conditions, to free themselves from the restrictions those
conditions entail, and to become “illegal”274 Labor and employment laws
de jure apply to all workers in Israel, regardless of their legal status,
although undocumented workers are less likely to assert their rights, due to
fear of attracting the authorities’ attention. Undocumented workers, unlike
their documented counterparts, are not covered by the mostly universal
health insurance scheme, and are denied access to the social security
system.275 Care workers who work legally with elderly or disabled
individuals and opt to violate their visa conditions often find work in other
types of care work—mainly childcare and domestic work, in a live-in or
live-out arrangement. No visas are granted for these occupations and
272. Irit Porata & Esther Iecovich, Relationships Between Elderly Care Recipients
and Their Migrant Live-In Home Care Workers in Israel, 29 HOME HEALTH CARE
SERV. Q. 1 (2010) (discussing the relationships that develop between migrant care
workers and their employers in Israel).
273. Rosenhek, Migration Regimes, supra note 166, at 57.
274. See GILAD NATAN, THE KNESSET RES. & INFO. CTR., UNLAWFUL FEES FOR
INTERMEDIATE AGENCIES IN WORK MIGRATION (2007), available at
http://www.knesset.gov.il/MMM/doc.asp?doc=m01729&type=doc
(in
Hebrew)
(estimating that there are 80,000 documented and a similar number of undocumented
migrants in Israel).
275. There are some exceptions. The National Insurance Institute (NII) has
discretion over benefit provision and can recognize undocumented migrants as eligible
for some benefits. For example, in 2003 the NII recognized an undocumented migrant
worker who was victim of sex trafficking as eligible for receiving worker’s injury
compensation. The case was presented by the worker’s lawyer, Ahuva Zaltsberg, at the
Oppression-Compensation Conference, Tel-Aviv University, July 2004. See Halley et
al., supra note 59, at 401.
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therefore workers who decide to engage in any of these jobs are
immediately in violation of their visas and become illegal. These workers,
while more vulnerable to exploitation because of fear of deportation,276
paradoxically may have more control over their life and working conditions
and may have better access to social networks and social services
(sometimes provided by local authorities).277 Accordingly, while they take
a higher risk in their migration status, the stakes are higher in both
directions: they are more vulnerable to deep commodification and
exploitation, but also have more employment opportunities, even if these
are still limited to the secondary labor market.278
As to the situation within Israeli households, the combination of the
welfare regime (long term care benefit), the issuance of guest workers’
visas, and the migrant workers’ substandard working conditions have made
the services of home care aides accessible to families across a broad
spectrum of income levels (excluding, of course, the poorest families)
leading to high levels of de-commodification within Israeli society.
b. Familialization and de-familialization
The Israeli guest worker regime seems to be a case in which defamilialization runs amok. Perhaps the clearest example of the heavily
commodifying approach of the Israeli regime and its instrumental treatment
of workers as laborers per se, is Israel’s official de-familializing
approach.279 Workers enter Israel on the condition that they leave their
families behind (immediate family members cannot work in Israel at the
same time) and do not establish families in Israel (for example, a newborn
baby has to be taken out of the country within twelve weeks).280 Thus the
276. For a description and analysis of the experiences of illegal migrant workers in
Israel, see Sarah S. Willen, Toward a Critical Phenomenology of “Illegality”: State
Power, Criminalization, and Abjectivity Among Undocumented Migrant Workers in Tel
Aviv, Israel, 45 INT’L MIGRATION 8, 13, 15-16 (2007).
277. See Rebeca Raijman & Adriana Kemp, The New Immigration to Israel:
Becoming a De Facto Immigration State in the 1990s, in IMMIGRATION WORLDWIDE:
POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND TRENDS 227, 239 (Uma A. Segal et al. eds., 2010).
278. ELLMAN & LAACHER supra note 269, at 18. (“Paradoxically, it is only when
these workers begin working illegally that this relationship of enslavement
disappears . . . [the] illegal migrant is then no longer bound to an employer or obliged
to work in one sector of activity: he or she can choose between various jobs.”).
279. For another example, see Mundlak & Shamir, supra note 40, at 169-70.
The state is thus willing to accept migrant workers into its economy and
society only instrumentally, as workers, denying their full experience as
residents. Whenever the workers’ human needs appear—i.e. a woman gives
birth, gets married, or . . . becomes ill—the state refuses to accommodate these
needs. In the legal sphere the migrant worker has no rights beyond the limited
rights that her status as a worker accords her.
Id.
280. Procedure for Treatment, supra note 182.
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immigration policy attempts to prevent the possibility of the settlement of
migrant workers.
Furthermore, unlike migrant workers in other labor sectors whose
migration to Israel is truly temporary, migrant care workers can potentially
stay in Israel legally for decades since the Ministry of Interior can extend
their visas as long as it deems that their departure will cause harm to their
employers. During these long years the extreme form of de-familialization
lends itself to a form of strong commodification.
Undocumented migrant workers, on the other hand, are “under the radar”
and, therefore, are not controllable in the same way as documented
migrants are. Despite Israel’s strong attempts to prevent settlement of
migrant workers, small migrant communities have been established,
introducing new needs related to education, health, and other social
services.281 While the state generally refuses to acknowledge these families
(a child born in Israel receives his parents’ status),282 this reality led some
local authorities to recognize them and provide social services including
school, health care, and family services.283 Thus, undocumented migrants
experience weaker de-familialization than their documented counterparts.
Furthermore, recently there was a public campaign for the naturalization of
the children of undocumented migrant workers which partly succeeded. A
government decision enabled the naturalization of 800 children of illegal
migrant workers who met certain criteria, while 400 other children who did
not meet the criteria will most likely be deported.284
The effect of the immigration regime on Israeli families is overall greater
women’s (and possibly men’s) de-familialization across income levels.
This Israeli policy has affected the level of care families are able to buy for
dependent family members as well as the levels of direct one-on-one care
281. Raijman et al., supra note 169.
282. There were two governmental decisions, in 2005 and in 2010, to “legalize”

children of illegal migrants. These decisions opened a path for the naturalization of the
children’s parents as well, once the children reach adulthood. For a description of the
2005 decision, see Nelly Elias & Adriana Kemp, supra note 145, at 84. For a
description of the 2010 decision, in which the government decided to naturalize
approximately 800 children and deport 400, see Dana Weiler-Polak, Cabinet Votes to
Expel 400 Children of Foreign Workers, HAARETZ, Aug. 2, 2010, available at
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/cabinet-votes-to-expel-400-children-offoreign-workers-1.305367.
283. Elias & Kemp, supra note 145, at 84 (citing Nelly Kfir, Caught in the Middle:
Central Government, Local Authorities, NGOs and the Socioeconomic Positioning of
the Children of Labor Migrants in Israel (2005) (unpublished Master’s thesis,
University of Amsterdam)).
284. Note that the agreement applies only to children whose parents entered Israel
legally, even if their stay later violated their visas. Other criteria set by the government
for naturalization are the following: the children speak Hebrew, they have been in
Israel for more than five years, and are either entering first grade or a higher school
grade. If the child was not born in Israel, she must have arrived in Israel before the age
of thirteen. Weiler-Polak, supra note 282.
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they can now avoid. Women, traditionally the main providers of unpaid
care in Israel, are the ones most directly affected: by the entrance of cheap
unskilled labor. The de-familialization level of Israeli women, as well as
their commodification levels, has increased across the class divide:285 the
levels of market participation (full time) by women increased286 as did,
most probably, their time for leisure. Increased de-familialization also
directly affects the bargaining endowment of women in families and their
exit options by increasing women’s ability to “commodify” themselves.
The “spill-over” of the regime is the availability of the care work of
undocumented migrants as domestic workers and nannies which further
increases the de-familialization of middle-class women.
c. Stratification
When documented and undocumented migrant workers entered the
Israeli labor market in the 1990s, the labor market was heavily segmented
and stratified along national lines with non-citizen Palestinian workers
incorporated in the least desirable occupations in the secondary market.287
Migrant workers partially substituted for the work of non-citizen
Palestinian workers, who, for security reasons, were no longer allowed into
Israel. While these two groups have distinct political statuses that affect
their secondary market incorporation, there is structural equivalence in
their condition.288
Accordingly, the outcome of the immigration regime is retrenchment of
a heavily stratified labor market.289 Documented and undocumented
migrant workers occupy precarious low-wage secondary market positions
that are in many ways a world apart from the economy in which even
285. It should be noted that there are great disparities between the labor market
participation of Jewish women (approximately 80% of women ages twenty five to fifty
five) and non-Jewish women (approximately 25% of women ages between twenty five
to fifty five). These disparities have only marginally changed in recent years. ORLY
ALMAGOR-LOTEN, THE KNESSET’S RES. & INFO. DIV., EMPLOYMENT OF ARAB WOMEN;
CONCENTRATION DATA (2008) (in Hebrew).
286. In 2008, approximately 72% of women between the ages of 25-55 participated
in the labor market, a distinct increase from the low 60% rates of the 1980’s. Naturally
migrant care work is far from being the sole reason for the increase but can definitely
be seen as one element, especially given a significant bump in women’s labor market
participation in the early 1990’s. CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, PERCENT IN
CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE BY AGE, POPULATION GROUP, AND SEX (2008), available at
http://www.cbs.gov.il/saka_y/01_02.pdf (in Hebrew).
287. Zeev Rosenhek, The Political Dynamics of a Segmented Labour Market:
Palestinian Citizens, Palestinians from the Occupied Territories and Migrant Workers
in Israel, 46 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 231, 243 (2003) (“[F]rom a strict structural dual
labour market perspective foreign workers smoothly replaced non-citizen Palestinians
in the construction and agriculture sectors . . .”).
288. Rosenhek, Migration Regimes, supra note 166, at 54-55 (2000).
289. Kemp, supra note 159, at 14-15.
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secondary market Israeli workers operate.
Among the Israeli buyers of care services, however, the immigration
regime reduced social stratification. As a result of the combination of the
immigration regime with the long term care benefit, relatively low income
families could now access in-home 24/7 care services resembling those
purchased by middle and possibly even high income households.
d. Intra-Household Division of Labor
In relation to IHDOL the different immigration regimes seem to have a
similar effect on gendered division of labor. A policy providing live-in
care for the elderly most clearly de-familializes women, but this also means
even less familial care-related expectations from men. If Israeli policy
instruments allow Israeli women to do less care work, under current social
conditions we can imagine that men do less too. If a man’s elderly mother
can now live in her own home safely with the help of a live-in migrant care
worker, this can mean several things: the mother will not live with the
man’s family, the man will, therefore, see his mother less, worry about her
less, and take care of her less because someone else is taking care of her
needs, all suggesting that under the Israeli regime men are also defamilialized. While the regime can be characterized as decreasing
stratification and enhancing class equality in this area of old age care, as
well as enabling gender equality by making it possible for more women to
work, it does not necessarily produce gender equality in terms of the
gendered division of labor.290
e. Material Delivery
Migrant workers’ wages in Israel—both documented and undocumented,
and across industries—tend to fall below the statutory minimum wage.291
The immigration regime allows employers to access cheap labor that most
likely would not have been supplied, at the same price, by Israeli
workers.292 In the area of care work the attempt to reduce care workers’
wages has occurred not only by toleration of violation of employment laws,
but also by the exclusion of care workers from the scope of the Hours of
Work and Rest Law as it relates to overtime compensation.293 The result of
the combination of the immigration and employment regimes is that the
sum cost of all the services that the care worker supplies makes a live-in
arrangement far cheaper than paying for its components: it is much more
290. NIZA BRKOVITCH, ADVA CTR., THE ISRAELI MODEL: TWO BREADWINNERS, ONE
CARE GIVER (2006) (in Hebrew).
291. HOTLINE FOR MIGRANT WORKERS, supra note 184, at 7 (2003).
292. Kemp, supra note 159, at 14-15.
293. See generally Mundlak & Shamir, supra note 40.
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economical to pay a live-in than to pay three people who work eight-hour
shifts in rotation.294 Accordingly, Israeli employers clearly benefit from
these arrangements. This is not to say that documented migrant workers do
not find benefit in the arrangement—some of them probably do—but from
a redistributive stand point, the redistribution between employers and
employees, or between Israel and the countries of origin, is minimized.
The effect of the immigration regime on the Israeli economy however is
not necessarily only beneficial. There is some correlation between the
entrance of migrant workers to Israel and increased unemployment rates in
the Israeli workforce as well as a rise in the number of Israeli households
that rely on welfare (the number of households that rely on income
supplement benefits grew fivefold between 1990 and 2002).295 While a
direct causal relation between the two phenomena is questionable,296 it is
safe to assume that at least in the areas of care work, nanny and domestic
work, some Israeli and legal migrant low-income local workers (mainly
women) who previously worked in these sectors found themselves priced
out of the market by illegal migrant workers, and turned to the state welfare
system for subsistence.
Undocumented workers are even more vulnerable than documented
workers and, therefore, potentially, can earn even less than documented
workers who have easier access to authorities and to information about
their legal rights, and whose working conditions are at least theoretically
supervised. Similar to the situation in the United States, the Israeli
immigration regime leads to lower wages of undocumented workers by
making their employment illegal and putting their employers at risk of
fines.297 The regime enhances the bargaining power of employers by
reducing the employment opportunities available to undocumented
migrants. At the same time undocumented migrant workers have more
control over their work conditions and wages; unlike documented workers
they can and do bargain for wages and move from one employer to another
when they are unsatisfied with their working conditions or when a better
financial opportunity appears.298 Undocumented migrant workers have the
294. See id., at 167-68.
295. See INTER-MINISTRY REPORT, supra note 156, at 27-28.
296. The report did not attempt to deal with arguments questioning the causal

relationship between migrant work and increased welfare reliance. Two classic
responses to this argument are: (1) the increase in welfare recipients is a result of wider
market restructuring rather than the entrance of migrant workers, and (2) the labor
sectors assigned to migrant workers (for the most part) are areas and industries that
Israelis didn’t occupy in any case.
297. For information about the United States, see Enchautegui, supra note 233, at
109-12. For information about Israel, see ISRAEL DRORI, FOREIGN WORKERS IN ISRAEL:
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 184-185 (2009).
298. ELLMAN & LAACHER, supra note 269, at 18.
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option, not open to most documented workers, to live-out of the employers
home, to have a series of day jobs, and accordingly to obtain greater control
over their working schedule as well as increased earnings.299
The combination of the guest-worker immigration policy and the longterm care benefit result in extensive de-commodification and defamilialization of Israeli residents as well as low levels of stratification
within Israeli residents. The Israeli case is an example of a liberal, marketreliant welfare state that through a combination of welfare law and
immigration law manages to create a relatively egalitarian apparatus for
insiders (residents and citizens)—in which middle-class as well as some
low-income members can purchase in-home care. The whole system could
not have functioned without the supply of cheap migrant labor. It therefore
seems that those who are carrying the main cost (or providing the subsidy)
for equality are outsiders, whose interests are rarely taken into account in
the design of welfare policy. Migrant workers are invited as guest workers
under the implicit condition that they will not expect full permanent
residency or citizenship and the rights that accompany such status. The
link between welfare state enlargement and the exposure of subordinate
groups, such as migrant workers, to unmediated market forces has been
recognized as part of the logic of the welfare state, and is often seen as
emanating from the need for labor market flexibility, when markets are
faced with rigidities caused by an expansion of social rights.300 Looked at
through this prism, the distributive outcome of the Israeli long-term care
benefit and the care worker guest visas seems less like an egalitarian
success and more like an accentuated version of traditional welfare state
logic and operation. It therefore raises questions as to whether behind
every welfare state success, there is a group that pays a price, and whether
any such price paid can be an acceptable cost.
IV. CONCLUSION
The comparative study of the three approaches to the regulation of the
migration of care workers—the Australian closed border regime, the
United States de facto open border, yet restricted, regime, and the Israeli
targeted guest-worker regime—and their effects on distribution in markets
of care shows the deep connection between the border and the family. It
further suggests that legal regulation has much to do with conditions of
vulnerability and the distribution of power in relation to migrant care
299. Cf. PARREÑAS 2001, supra note 13, at 154.
300. See Gary Freeman, Migration and the Political Economy of the Welfare State,

485 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 51 (1986); Zeev Rosenhek, The
Exclusionary Logic of the Welfare State: Palestinian Citizens in the Israeli Welfare
State, 14 INT’L SOC. 195, 198-99 (1999).
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workers, and the households in which they work. The comparative study
offers some possibly surprising conclusions.
First, the analysis showed that, in a globalized world, there is no one
position on the issue of the immigration of unskilled workers that does not
include trade-offs. The Australian refusal to create guest worker visas does
prevent the creation of a migrant under-class but also avoids helping the
struggling economies of the Pacific states that neighbor it. Israel and the
United States both participate in the economy of remittances that Australia
prefers to avoid, and contribute to redistribution in this sense, but each
offers its own tradeoffs. In the United States, the migration of care workers
is illegal but largely tolerated, creating a market of care that is structured
around the great vulnerability of migrant care workers. In Israel, the need
for care labor is acknowledged via the guest worker regime, yet the
regime’s extreme rigidity led to the development of a shadow market of
illegal migrants who are at once more vulnerable and less restricted.
Second, the comparison showed that despite the similarities in legal
regulation related to immigration such regulation is intensely implicated in
the vulnerability of migrant workers. So much so that in many cases
“legal” workers are in a worse bargaining position than their “illegal”
counterparts, exposing the way the immigration regime that endows
migrant workers with “legality” as migrants concurrently strips them of
their bargaining power as workers. The Israeli case showed how
undocumented migrants, while risking exploitation and deep
commodification (and eventual deportation), tend to fare better,
considering their mobility in the informal labor market and their social
mobility (expressed in the measurement of familialization and material
delivery).
Third, the comparative distributional analysis revealed that, at a general
level, similarities in migrant care work can be found across different
immigration regimes. Relatively high levels of commodification of
migrant care workers (at least in relation to that of local workers), seem to
be a characteristic of migrant labor. This is accompanied by high levels of
stratification in the labor market of the receiving country, in which
unskilled migrants are incorporated into the lower echelons of the
secondary market. Moreover, despite the fact that the cheap labor of
migrant care workers frees the women that employ them to join the labor
market and enter the public realm, the intra-household gendered division of
labor proves formidable both in the employer’s household, and in the
household of the migrant worker in the country of origin. Accordingly, the
immigration regime seems to have little affect on gendered IHDOL.
Fourth, the analysis shows that, despite similarities in outcomes of the
different immigration regimes, there is great significance in a more detailed
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analysis that takes into account the operation of the immigration regime
and the background rules of the market which it shapes. The analysis
showed that regimes that look the same “on the books,” can lead to
opposite outcomes “in action.” The United States and Australia are both
characterized as settlers’ immigration regimes which by ethos and by law
are built around immigration that is gradually developed into settlement
and not on temporary work migration. However, while both disallow the
migration of unskilled workers (with a narrow exception for farm workers
in the United States), in reality the U.S. regime is only mildly enforced and
undocumented, unskilled workers are tolerated and have become important
economic actors, while, in Australia, the regime is strictly enforced, leading
to a much smaller role for undocumented workers in the secondary labor
market.
This divergence stems both from the intensity of enforcement of the
immigration regime as well as the effects of background rules. The liberal
welfare state regime in the United States, which relegates the provision of
care services to the market with little regulation or subsidies, creates high
demand for care work. One way the cost of care work is reduced is
through the exclusion of care workers from most employment protections,
thus significantly reducing labor cost; another is the partial and weak
enforcement of the immigration regime. In Australia on the other hand,
though care work is similarly provided through the market and contracted
for individually, the demand for cheap care labor is reduced by the
regulation of care services and the relatively generous subsidies to low
income workers and (less generous) tax breaks to middle and high income
households. The welfare regime as it relates to care work provides the
backdrop to the de jure and de facto restrictive immigration regime.
Fifth, the distributional analysis reveals the deep trade-offs and
compromises that are nested within each of the three immigration regimes.
Some of these trade-offs are not inherent and can possibly be resolved, but
others are part and parcel of the structure of sovereignty that is based on the
power to exclude. Developed economies want to reap the benefits of the
cheap labor of unskilled workers without risking their permanent
settlement. They, therefore, reach various institutional arrangements
towards the regulation of unskilled immigrant labor. From the extremely
stringent Israeli guest-worker visa, via the Australian purist closed border
position, to the laissez faire American solution, the problems attached to
“illegality” (namely worker vulnerability) remain mostly un-remedied. The
paradox however is that in many cases (the Bracero Program in the United
States, the guest-worker visa in Israel) the fear of the settlement of
undocumented workers makes countries devise guest worker regimes that
are even worse than the risky and vulnerable position of undocumented
migrants. This insight suggests that any assumption about a simple and
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clear connection between legality, distribution, and redistribution must be
questioned and contextualized. It suggests the perhaps unlikely conclusion
that, in the context of work migration of unskilled workers that are not
desired as future citizen, at times market-led mechanisms may lead to more
egalitarian and redistributive results than state-led mechanisms. However,
admittedly, this is perhaps a choice between two evils.
Finally, the analysis shows the vital connection between immigration
policies as they relate to care work, and familial care. For example, it
would be difficult to understand the familial inter-generational expectation,
dependencies, and practices in Israel, without recognizing the role of
migrant care workers in care provision, which further affect family
structure and living arrangements.301 It suggests that, as lawyers, in order
to understand the distribution of power within families, we need to pay
attention not only to traditional family law, but also to the surrounding
market realities and the role played by market actors and state policies, and
chief among those policies is a country’s immigration regime.

301. For example, with the relatively easy access to affordable migrant home-care
workers, it is becoming less and less common for elderly parents to move in with their
grown children. See Svein Olav Daatland & Ariela Lowenstein, Intergenerational
Solidarity and the Family—Welfare State Balance, EUR. J. AGING 174, 178-81 (2005).
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